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Cert to CA 7: Fairchild, Sprecher, Campbell
Resp
B~~~lwas convicted of a crime in Wisc and sentenced to 15
years,
E
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execution of the sentence to be

pend~ He was thus on probation .

He was arrested for

another crime and his probation was revoked by the prison
officials without affording him a hearing .

He sued in distr

ct which held that he was entitled to a hea_rJ;_ng and appointed
counsel before his probation« could be suspended .

The state

seeks cert.
The issue is the due process rights of persons whose
probation is revoked . In Morrisey v . Brewer the Court
held that a~ hearing must be held before parole can be revoked .
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However, M,.___
orrisey while xxa: saying that the prisoner has a
right to retained counsel or a friend at the parole revocation
hearing , avoids the question of appointed counsel.
v. Rhay, :i2 389 U.S. 128 (1967),
because the def had
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probation was revoked, and

never been sentenced, he was brought

into court for sentencing .

The Court ruled that under those

circumstances, t h e ~ was entitled to appointed counsel, but
it seems that the focus was on the sentencing proceedings.
At..,[:t, the Court has not ruled on the right to appointed counselll

-

at probation revocation or for that matter on the right to a
hearing , althou gh MNNXXX Morissey seems to dictate the result
of the latter issue.

The

EX:X«N:K

question of right to counsel,

Therefore, I think the Court

should grant this petition.
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Dear Mr~'1.,;, ffoudon: ,
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I am working on a case involving probation and parole. It would .,
be helpful to have th~ following information, if it _can be obtained without .:
too much difficulty:·:,.·
·:
~-- ·
· . ,' ·
.
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1. As. ·of the latest available reporting date, how many persons . ,,
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· are on probation and',,il paroler"':.in;; the~"' United States?
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2. ' If the statistics are broken down between probationers and
~ parolees, I would 11 {e to have this information (that is, of the total
v figures, how many are on probation and how many on parole?)

',' ·

3. If statistical tables are readily available ( requiring no
independent compilations on your part} how do the latest available figures
compai-e 1with those of five and ten years ago?
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4. Again~ if the figures are readily available, what percentage
of convicted persons are placed oo probation in (i) misdemeanor eases,
(ii) felony cases, and (iii) tctal?
"
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5. As of the latest available information, what ts the total number
of persons presently serving time (in custody in some form or prison
or detention institution) for felony convictions in (i) federal institutions
and ( ii) state institutions?
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(a) What percentage of persons convicted of felonies are
'fi

paroled?
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o·~ the statistics indicate any trend toward increasing ;:,.

(b)

the percentage of prisoners who are paroled? ...
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Although you will know far better than I where to look, there is
a National Probation and Parole Association (I believe this is its name)
which should have these figures readily available form). If this
organization is headquartered in )Vashington, I should think that one
·~ of your assistants could go there and obtain the information _ in a matter ~
" of hours. The FBI also may have the information:'
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I would like to have this data fairly promptly. All '" ,
of it may 'not be available in precisely the form outlined above, and so "
you should feel 'fre~. to provide what is available generally in this area.
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P. s. In addition to the fore going information, and if the figures are
readily available, I would also.-liketto know either in terms of percentages
or absolute figures or beth, (1) the number of probattoo revocation
hearings that were held during the last year for which figures are
available, and (11) the number of parole revocatioo hearings so held.
These hearings are normally held before a state parole or probation
board or some other comparable administrative body.
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ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS
SUPREME COURT BUILDING
WASHINGTON, O.C. 20544
ROWLAND F. KIRKS

WAYNE P. JACKSON

DIRECTOR

CHIEF OF THE DIVISION

WILLIAM E. FOLEY
DEPUTY DIRECTOR

OF PROBATION

March 15, 1973

Mr. Edward G. Hudon
Librarian, Supreme Court Library
Supreme Court Building
Washington, D. C. 20544
Dear Mro Hudon:
The following information is provided in response to your
telephone inquiry of March 12.
1.

Persons Under Federal Supervision

Attachment No. 1 provides the number of persons under the
supervision of our offices as of January 1973, and in June 1972,
1970, 1967, and 1962. The figures are broken down into supervision
types.
2.

Percentage Use of Probation--U. S. District Courts including
District of Columbia

Total number
of convicted
defendants sentenced
FY 1972\
39,587
FY 19703
29,859
27,073
FY 19674
FY 1962
29,499

Percentage
imprisoned
46.4
45.4
50.1
50.0

Percentage
Placed on
probation
40.9
39.9
35.8
38.4

Percentage
fined or
other disposition
12.7
14.7
14.2
11.5

Sources:
1Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of
States Courts 1972, (Table D7)o
2Administrative Office publication, Federal Offenders in
States Courts 1970, (Tables DS & DSA, pgs. 108 & 107).
3Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of
States Courts 1967, (Tables D5 & DSA, pgs. 264 & 268).
4
Ann~al Report of the Director, Administrative Office of
States Courts 1963, (Pgs. 133, Table 0).
NOTE:

$

%

the United
the United
the United
the United

Percents may not add to 100.0 percent due to rounding.

\'"

Page 2
We do not have figures as to the percentage use of probation
on felony cases as contrasted with misdemeanor types. Attachment
No. 2 is a table from Administrative Office publication, Federal
Offenders in the United States District Courts 1970, which reports
on the proportionate use of probation in certain offense categories.
3.

Probation Revocation.

We do not have statistics as to the number of revocation
hearings but we keep records as to the percentage of unsatisfactory
completions of supervisiono In many of these cases a revocation
hearing has taken place. An example of an unsatisfactory completion of probation supervision without a revocation hearing would
be in the case of a violator who receives a state sentence on a
new charge and the federal court deems it inadvisable to impose
another sentence as a probation violator and orders the probation
terminated.
Attachment No. 0 s 3, 4, 5, and 6 reflect the total number of
cases closed in a given fiscal year and the percentage of unsatisfactory completions of supervision in various supervision types.
I trust the above information will be of assistance to you.
Sincerely,

~c/4~~
Michael Jo Keenan
Assistant Chief of Probation
Enclosures

·.

,.

"

~-:~

~' ~t- "f

Attachment No. 1
PERSONS UNDER SUPERVISION - U.S. PROBATION SYSTEM
JANUARY 1973 1

JUNE 30, 1972 2

JUNE 30, 1970 2

JUNE 30 2 1967 2

JUNE 30, 1962 2

TOTAL

51,528

49,023

38,409

37,848

36,663

Court Probation

36,327

34,573

27,144

25,752

26,925

U.S. Magistrate
Probation (formerly
Uo So Corrnnissioner)

1,910

1,426

300

225

211

Deferred Prosecution

699

767

617

542

528

Parole & Military
Parole

10,692

10,210

8,443

9,109

6,787

Mandatory Release

1,900

2,047

1,905

2,220

2,212

Sources:
1
Probation Division, Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts
2
Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, 1972, 1970, 1967, 1962.

ATTACHMENT No. 2
'7 o bl~ l

89 U1it~d Stat•• District Court•
~ r ot Per•on• Convicted and Propo:·tioriatl!P Uae- of Probation for the Eight Of!•n•• Claaaea,
Fio1cal v .. are 1963 - 1970

Offense Group

1

CLASS I

,,

1
j

Numb r onvi ted
1%5
1966
1967

1963

1964

TOTAL CONVICTED ••••••••••••••••••••••••••

24,965

23,081

22,122

20,929

(Fraud, embezzlement, obscene mail)••••••

2,490

2,180

1,939

1,632

1968

1969

1970

19,999

20,503

20,164

21,053

1,566

1,526

1,718

1,871

CLASS II (Income tax fraud, other fraud) •••••••••

1,725

1,178

1,063

997

899

785

773

765

CLASS III (Ligucr, Internal Revenue) ••••••••.••••

4,517

4,445

3,999

3,406

2,893

2,577

1,934

1,658

CLASS IV (Theft, postal fraud, forgery) ••••••••••

5,783

5,348

4,791

4,566

4,120

4,428

4,127

4,616

1,502

1,070

1,088

1,158

1,284

1,321

1,470

2,254

CLASS VI (Counterfeiting, burglary, transportation
of stolen property, marihuan~, Selective
Servjce Act, other national defense laws
sex offenses) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••

2,595

2,351

2,425

2,698

3,097

3,649

4,383

4,426

CLASS VII (Auto theft) ••••••••••• , •••••••••••••••

5,051

5,066

5,041

4,843

4,523

4,402

3,791

3,542

CLASS VIII (Narcotics and robb@ry) •••••••••••••••

1,302

1,443

l, 776

1,629

l,617

1,815

1,968

1,921

TOT/IL PLACED ON PROBATION •••••••••••••••••••••••••

50.l

50.2

49.0

49 .l

47.l

47.9

49.l

45.3

CLASS I (Fraud, embezzl!'ment, obscene mail) •••••••

83.l

84.4

85.3

83.l

82.9

87 .l

87.0

86.5

CLASS V (Border reg. addicts, assault and

l

I

homicide; misc. qeneral offenses) •••••••

J
I

.;.
I-'
I

Proporti¢nate Use of Pro})qtion

2

CLASS II (Inccme tax fraud, other fraud) ••••••••••

57.9

57.3

57.5

58.1

58.0

61.4

64.8

62.7

CLASS III (Liquor, Internal Revenue) ••••••••••••••

65.2

65,7

b4.6

67.2

69.6

68.5

69.6

71.4

CI.~SS IV (Theft, postal fraud, forgHy) •••••••••••

54.7

54,7

55.4

57.6

54.6

57.l

57.5

61.2

38.2

44.5

39.6

44.0

39.2

37 .5

35.2

41.3

sex offenses) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••

36.6

37.6

36.8

38.0.

35.2

40.6

46.l

54.9

CLhSS VII (Auto theft) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

33.3

33.5

34.S

33.9

34.4

34.3

36.4

37.9

CI.J:SS VIII (Narcotics and robbery) ••••••••••••••••

9.4

11.0

H.C

15.2

12.2

12.9

1.4.l

16.2

CLASS V (Border reg. addicts, assault and
homicide, misc. gener.:il offen~es) ••••••••

I

CLASS VI (Counterfeiting, burglary, transportation
of stolen property, marihuana, Selective
Service Act, other national defense laws ,

NOTE,

----------

#

Exclude• for all years persona convicted for violation of irrvnigration l~wa, wagering tax lawa and violationa of
Federal regulatory acta. See Appendix for com>lete o!fenae claasification.
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Attachment No. 3
PERCENTAGE OF OFFENDERS REMOVED UNSATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF SUPERVISION

TYPE OF SUPERVISION

Calendar Year 1972
Total number
Percent removed
unsatisfactory
removed from
· supervision
completion of supervision

TOTAL

23,952

17.0

Probation

14,738

15.8

989

10.7

638

1.6

Parole

4,820

24 o5

Mandatory Release

2,767

14 o9

u.

S. Magistrate
Probation (formerly
U. S o Commissioner)

Deferred Prosecution

Source:
Probation Division, Administrative Office, U.S. Courts

Attachment No. 4
PERCENTAGE OF OFFENDERS REMOVED UNSATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF SUPERVISION
FY 1968

TYPE OF SUPERVISION

Total number
removed from
supervision

Percent removed
unsatisfactory
completion of supervision

TOTAL

21,726

22.7

Probation

12,030

17.5

U.S. Magistrate
Probation (formerly U.S. Connnissioner)

278

8.3

Deferred Prosecution

541

4.6

Parole

5,978

34.8

Mandatory Release

2,899

24.O

Source:
Probation Division, Administrative Office, U.S. Courts

Attachment No. 5
PERCENTAGE OF OFFENDERS REMOVED UNSATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF SUPERVISION
FY 1967

TYPE OF SUPERVISION

Total number
removed from
supervision 1

Percent removed
unsatisfactory
completion of supervision 2

TOTAL

21,129

20.8

Probation

12,558

15.6

266

9.1

521

4.3

Parole

5,583

35 . 6

Mandatory Release

3,068

22.6

133

7.0

U.

s.

Magistrate
probation (formerly U. S. Cormnissioner)

Deferred Prosecution

Military Parole

Sources:
1
Annual Re2ort of the Director 2 Administrative Office 2 U.S. Courts 2 1967
Pg. 159 Table 5.
2
Annual ReEort of the Director 2 Administrative Office 2 U.S. Courts 2 1968
Pg. 154 Table 7.

Attachment No. 6
PERCENTAGE OF OFFENDERS REMOVED UNSATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF SUPERVISION
FY 1962
Total number
removed from
supervision

Percent removed
unsatisfactory
completion of supervision

TOTAL

20,323

21.3

Probation

11,942

18.2

U.S. Magistrate
Probation (formerly
U. So Corrnnissioner)

163

12.8

Deferred Prosecution

346

9.8

Parole

4,424

30.5

Mandatory Release

3,341

22.7

107

1.8

TYPE OF SUPERVISION

Military Parole

Sources:
3Anrmal Report of the Director, Administrative Office, U.S. Courts 1962,
Page 136, Table 3.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

March 29, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1225 -

Gagnon v. Scarpelli

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

It,_.11.
Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

'

~u:µrnnt ~cu.rt cf tqt 'Jtlnittb ~htttt.l

Jr1ulfyittgtcn. }0. ~- 2ag;1~~
CHAMBERS OF

\
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 29, 1973

71-1225 - Gagnon v. Scarpelli
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,
-..",.'

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

QJottrt of tfrr ~ttittb ~taus
Jlnsqittghttt, ~. QJ. 2llffe'-l-$

~lt.Vfttttt

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

March 29, 1973

RE: No. 71-1225 Gagnon v. Scarpelli
Dear Lewis:
I agree.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc; The Conference

,'-1..,

Re: No. 71-1225 Gagnon v.
'~- , .

Dear Bill:

,·

.

My reason for ccncluding that respondent is entitled to a
hearing is that Morrissey applied in terms cnly to a parole revocation,
not to a probaticn revocation. The first question the present opinion
needed to address, then, was whether a probationer is entitled to a
hearing upon revocation. While I felt that the questicm was an easy
one in light of Morrissey, I thought it necessary to decide it explicitly.
Respcmdent gets the benefit of our ruling that a probationer is
entitled to such a hearing only because his case happens to be our
vehicle for deciding the questicm.
Sincerely,
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.iu.prtmt (!Jcurt cf tqt 'Jltnittb .ibdts
•as!fingbm. ~. (!}. 2llffeJ!.;l
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

March 29, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1225 - Gagnon v. Scarpelli

Dear Lewis:
Since we said in Morrisey v. Brewer that our holding
there was not retroactive, I had some difficulty at first
blush with your conclusion that since Scarpelli did not
get a hearing, he is entitled to habeas. You have undoubtedly
thought the thing through much more than I have, but I
wonder if some word of explanation in the opinion might not
be in order.

-----

Sincerely~

Mr. Justice Powell

tlft ~tb ,jtaf.ts
'llaaJringLtu. ~. <!f. 2ll.;i'l,.;t

,ju:µuutt <lfltlttt d

I

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

"·

March 30, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1225 - Gagnon v. Scarpelli

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

..
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,.·,

'

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

March 30, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1225 - Gagnon v. Scarpelli

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,r

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

/
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CHAMBERS OF

April 3, 1973

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

/

No. 71-1225 - Gagnon, Warden v. Scarpelli

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

Conference

.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 3, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1225, Gagnon v. Scarpelli

Dear Lewis:
I am not yet at rest on your opinion.
I cannot yet see how you can have a workable "sometimes"
rule on counsel.

The result of discretionary rules on counsel is to

give rise to equal protection claims.

It is a troublesome area.

In the next week I will conclude whether to join, to join
the result or write separately.

\Jr{'~
Mr. Justice Powell

$,u.p-ttmt <qoutt of !qt J:tritt~ .Sta:ftg
•as4ittght~ J. <q. 2llffe'!,
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 8, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1225 - Gagnon v. Scarpelli

Dear Lewis:
I have worked out my reservations on the discretionary
nature of the appointment of counsel so that I can now join you.
I hope my concerns are groundless for this is a most
sensitive and important area.

/
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Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference
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Cases held for No. 71-1225, GAGNON v. SCARPELLI
'•
.......•:.,,

MEMORAN11 UM TO THE CONFERENCE

I'

Four cases involving the right to appointed counsel at parole
·.,.re,;ocation p ·oceedings were held for Gagnon v. E'carpelli. Vvhile
::thaf case was itself a probation revocation case, we there set
standards for the appointment of counsel at both probation and
parole revocation proceedings.
1. Martinez v. Alldredge (No. 72-5709).

Petitioner was convicted in 1963 of a federal narcotics offense
and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. In 1969, he was
granted parole, but shortly thereafter was arrested for and pleaded
guilty to a state charge of possession of cocaine. After serving his
state term, he was afforded a federal revocation interview on
December 1, 1970. He executed a written waiver of counsel and
admittr:d a parole violation -- that is, that he had been convicted of
a statc,, crime. He argues that he admitted the parole violation only
after having been denied the right to appointed counsel. He makes
no claim in mitigation of the violation.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli held that one who makes no colorable
claim that he did not commit the violation or that there were substantial reasons in mitigation of the violation is not entitled to
appointed counsel. Accordingly, I will vote to deny.

'·

,

.

'

'

- 22. California Adult Authority v. Griffin (No. 72-780).
This is a petition for cert to the Ninth Circuit. The California
Adult Authority seeks review of three decisions concerning its
probation revocation practices.

,.'

.

, '

In f'ennis v. California Adult Authority z 456 F. 2d 1240 (1972),
and Wilburn v. Nelson, 458 F. 2d 502 {1972), both decided before
this Court's decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(June 29, 1972), the Ninth Circuit established a due process case-by-case
standard both for hearing rights and for the right to counsel. The
Ninth Circuit applied those decisions to all cases pending before it
on or after January 25, 1972. In the three cases involved here, the
respective district courts rendered their decisions before Dennis
and Wilburn. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded them to the
district courts for reconsideration in light of Dennis and \Vilburn.
It did so after Morrissey,, but instructed the district courts that
Morrissey was inapplicable by,J,t s terms (408 U.S., at 490) to
revocations on or before .June 2~, including the revocations involved
h_e re.
I
I

In its cert petition, the Adult Authority argues that no revocation
rights should be affcrdsd to paroleef; whose parole was revoked
before ..Tune 29, 1972. While we might conceivably grant cert to
address this contention, it is clouded by the fact that to some extent
the Ninth Circuit anticipated this Court's decisions in Morrissey and
Gagnon. To reverse the Court of Appeals, we would have to determine
the retroactivity of its own earlier decision.
I am therefore inclined to grant, vacate, and remand to allow
the Court of Appeals to reconsider its decisions in light of Gagnon v.
Scarpelli. This inclination is reinforced by the fact that each of the
three respondents makes different claims on the merits, ranging
from the right to appointed counsel to the right to retain counsel to the
right to present witnesses in mitigation.
3. M'Clary v. California Adult Authority (No. 72-5770).

.

'

,,
•'

·'

...
I

Petitioner M'Clary, who is one of the respondents in No. 72-780,
filed this cross-petition, contending primarily that a parolee is entitled
to retained counsel in all cases. This issue was specifically left open

,: '

.,,
~

.

'

.

'

.."

,.
J

•

'

'

,I

-3-

in Cagnon v. Scarpelli, p. 5 , n. 6. Because this case is intertwined
with No. 72-780, and because it seems to me appropriate to allow
the Court of Appeals to address this contention in the first instance,
I will vote to grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration in
light of Gagnon v. Scarpelli.
4. Gardner v. McCarthy (No. 72-5398).

This is yet another case involving the Ninth Circuit's standards
and the practices of the California Adult Authority. At his January,
1972, revocation hearing, petitioner was not afforded Morrissey
rights nor was he allowed to have retained counsel. Revocation was
based on a plea of guilty to a charge of assault with force likely to
produce great bodily harm. He claims mitigation, and would have
produced witnesses on that que~tion if he had been allowed to do so.
Again, Twould grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration in light
of Gagnon v. Scarpelli.
·j
.

I
L.P.P., Jr.

lfp/gg
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MEMORAN UM TO TI-IE CONFERENCE
,,

Four cases involving the right to 'appointed counsel at parole
revocation proceedings were held for Gagnon v. Scarpelli. While
that case was itself a probation revocation case, we there set
standards for the appointment of counsel at both probation and
parole revocation proceedings.

\

\
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I

\

\

) . Martiri.ezv. Alldredge (No. 72-5709).

J

Petitioner was convicted in 1963 of a federal narcotics offense
and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. In 1969, he was
granted parole, but shortly thereafter was arrested for and pleaded
guilty to a state charge of possession of cocaine. After serving his
state term, he was afforded a federal revocation interview on
December 1, 1970. He executed a written waiver of counsel and
admitted a parole violation -- that is, that he had been convicted of
a state £rime. He argues that he admitted the parole violation only
after having been denied the right to appointed counsel. He makes
no claim in mitigation of the violation.
1

Gagnon v . Scarpelli held that one who makes no colorable
claim that he did not commit the violation or that there were substantial reasons in mitigation of the violation is not entitled to
appointed counsel. Accordingly, I will vote to deny.

.,

•'
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2. California Adult Authority v. Griffin (No . 72-780) .
This is a petition for cert to the Ninth Circuit. The California
Adult Authority seeks review of three decisions concerning its
probation revocation practices .
In Pennis v. California Adult Authority, 456 F . 2d 1240 (1972),
and Wilburn v. Nelson, 458 F. 2d 502 (1972), both decided before
this Court's dee ision in Morrissey v . Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(June 29, 1972), the Ninth Circuit established a due process case-by-case
standard both for hearing rights and for the right to counsel. The
Ninth Circuit applied those decisions to all cases pending before it
on or after January 2 5, 1972. In the three cases involved here, the
respective district courts rendered their decisions before Dennis
and Wilburn. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded them to the
district courts for reconsideration in light of Dennis and Wilburn: ·
It did so after Morrissef?, but instructed the district courts that ,. ·'
Morrissey was inapplicable by its terms (408 U.S., at 490) to
revocations . on.or before June 29, including the revocations involved
here.
·
':·
:

'·'

.

..

(

.•·""

·. fu 'i ts cert petition, the Adult Authority argues that no revocation
rights should be afforded to parolees whose parole was revoked
before June 29, 1972. While we might conceivably grant cert to
address this contention, it is clouded by the fact that to some extent
the Ninth Circuit anticipated this Court's decisions in IV orrissey and
Gagnon. To reverse, the Court of Appeals, we woulg. have to determine
the retroactivity of its own earlier decision. ·'•
l..

'J),

:)£

I am therefore inclined to grant, vacate, and remand to allow
the Court of Appeals to reconsider its decisions in light of Gagnon v.
Scarpelli. This inclination is reinforced by the fact that each of the
three respondents makes different claims on the merits, ranging
fr om the right to appointed counsel to the right to retain counsel to the
right to present ";'itnesses Jn mitigation.

•.,

'
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3. M'Clary' v.. California Adult Authority (No. 72-5770) •

~

Petitioner M'Clary, who is one of the respondents in No. 72-780,
filed this cross-petition, contending primarily that a parolee is entitled
to retained counsel in all cases. This issue was specific~lly left open
.· 'i,

.,..

"\·

'.

. .,
/{ y

'

j,

'

- 3 -

in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, p. 5 , n. 6. Because this case is intertwined
with No. 72-780, and because it seems to me appropriate to allow
the Court of Appeals to address this contention in the first instance,
I will vote to grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration in
light of Gagnon v. Scarpelli.
4. Gardner

v. McCarthy (No. 72-5398).

,,,

•.

This is yet another case involving the Ninth Circuit's standards •,
and the practices of the California Adult Authority. At his January,
1972, revocation hearing, petitioner was not afforded Morrissey
rights nor was he allowed to have retained counsel. Revocation was
based on a plea of guilty to a charge of assault with force likely to ~
produce great bodily harm. He claims mitigation, and would have
produced witnesses on that question if he had been allowed to do so.
Again, I would grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration in light
of Gagnon v •. Scarpelli.
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Note to Bill Kelly:
A point made in p titioner brief which we hav not answered
r lates to the problem of "interstate cases"
I

ief 20, et seq.

r onally see no r ally good answer to this problem, which

may well be a serious one in view of the large numbers involved
nd the specificity of the Morrissey requirements. I would lik for
us to try, at least, to ee if we can write a footnote which might
add a helpful gloss on the dilemma which apparently is created by
MO_!'!.issey. The following represents an off the cuff first try:

Petitioner argues,

ith some reason, that the Morrissey

he ring requirement impose serious practical, if not legal,
problems where the parolee or probationer has been llowed to
leav the c cnvictin

state and be supervised elsewhere as was

ture in this case. Under the

:.llmlltBtlDaa:

inte tate compact

authorized by the Congres , effective in Wisconsin (Wisconsin
statutes 1967,

§

57. 13) and in all other states, reciprocal

2.
provisions can be made for the out-of-state supervision of

...

•',

probationers and parolees who are authorized to leave the sentencing

,:.

state. Petitioner's brief asserts that as of June 30, 1972, Wisconsin
had a total of 642 parolees and probationers being so supervised in
other states, and that as of January 1972 incomplete information

,.

,,

I
11
I

rel~lised by the Council of State Governments indicated a total of
(

/
24) 693 persons under out-of-state supervision pursuant to the
'.
,,,

interstate compact. Petitioner's Brief, 21, 22.

The problems

'.
arise with respect to Morrissey required hearings, and will vary
depending on the degree of cooperation from the officials of the
;,,•

supervising state, where and when the hearings are to be held,
,,

...,

and whether witnesses are willing - when they cannot be compelled -

I
I

I

..
'

I
' to attend a hearing in another state, and the like.
It is not doubt true that added burdens and uncertainties

t'

result from the ~orrissey formulations. Yet, we struck the
balance in favor of the specified due process requirements and
in the belief that accommodations can be made without undue

'·

•'

3.
disruption. If necessary, changes can be made to adjust the
interstate compact to the Morrissey-prescribed procedure. In
,. '

the absence of formal agreement, law enforcement and probation
and parole authorities among the states have iDrglx long accommodated
themselves to the inevitable inconveniences of our federal system,
and have displayed a commendable willingness to cooperate.

..,...

.,

The Morrissey requirement which causes petitioner the

,,I"·

greatest concern in this respect relates to the rights to present
witnesses, and to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses.

..
With respect to confrontation and cross examination, petitioner

','
-~
..' "'
,..

.
.

,i-, ~.

'

}'

may have over looked the express qualification to the effect that
''the hearing officer [may] specifically [find] good

U••M

cause

for not allowing confrontation." Morrissey at 489. There can
be a variety of satisfactory causes for not allowing the calling

or the confrontation and cross examination of witnesses in the

-~

type of' administrative, informal hearing required in these cases.

.... '

,J

.''.
.

.,
.. ,·

;

I)

.,...

'i~.-

,,

....
~-'

,,·,._

.

~- .
~

,.
,·~
.
' ~- .

4.
If it proves impractical or impossible to produce an out-of-state

witness, this may constitute the requisite good cause. As noted
elsewhere in Mm Morrissey, evidence need not be in the customary
adversary form but letters, affidavits, depositions and other
relevant material may be

••»Hi

substituted for more formal methods

of trial.

\

\
\
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We emphasize, nevertheless, the informality and limited
scope of the required hearings. The preservation of these

0

characteristics is necessary to BC!Dt accomplish the penological
purposes of probation and parole. As noted in Morrissey, supra at
477, the "purpose is to help individuals reintegrat into society
as constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being
confined (in the case of parole) for the full term of the sentence
imp0$ed. It also serves to alleviate the cost to society of keeping
an individual in prison. " In short, the primary objective is
fehabtlitative rather than punitive. It is essential, the refore,

I

, that the system retain a high degree of tiedl flexibility and
administrative discretion. A study in Wisconsin of the factors
affecting the decision whether to revoke probation or parole
aiqmack emphasized that:

I

"The authority to exercise discretion in deciding
to revoke or not to revoke offenders under supervision is considered necessary if probation and
parole are to remain workable systems. A

2.

.

Similarly, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court in Morrissey

'

stated that the ultimate decision "is not purely factual but also
[is 1predictive and discretionary. " Supra at 480. The factors
".'

entering into these decisions relate in major part to a professional
evaulation, by trained probation and parole officers, as to the
0//erall social readjustment of the offender in the community, and
include due consideration of such intangibles as the offender's

,.-

relationship toward his family, his attitude toward the fulfillment

:,

-.,,

' I-".
_,..,.
'
\

of financial obligations, the extent of his cooperation with the

'
r/

I . .;;,~.

probation officer assigned to his case, his personal associations,

-.
and - of course - whether there havem been specific and significant

(

violations of the conditions of the probation. The importance of these
considerations, some factual and other& :mdduly entirely judgmental,
is illustrated by the Wisconsin empirical study which disclosed that

--

JDIIIX

some 25% of the offenders studied (on probation or parole) who

committed new offenses were [nevertheless] continued on field
B

",,..

supervision . . . "

'·

I

\

,,.·,

..•

..

.
'

·./

.,,
•,

"'"

.·

,..,

3.
The training duty and attitude of the parole or probation
..• {~ "!

officer is also relevant to the nature of the hearings and to the

,.

conditions under which counsel may be desirable.:
''While the parole or probation officer recognizes his
double duty to the welfare of his clients and to the
safety of the general community, by and large concern
for the client dominates his professional attitude.
The parole agent ordinarily defines his role as
:qm representing his client's best interests as long
as these do not ccmstitute a threat to public safety.
The police officer, in contrast, is concerned imx:
primarily with public safety."

****

·'

,.

,,,

,·\

ts'••

'

.
;

"Revocation • . • is, if anything, commonly treated
as a failure of supervision. While presumably it would
be inappropriate for a field agent neverto n revoke, the
whole thrust of the probation-parole movement is to keep
men in the community, working with adjustment problems
there, and using revocation only as a last resort when
treatment has failed or is about to fail." C
.,,,

The revocation hearing, then, is neither a trial nor an
adversary proceeding in the normal sense of these terms. In view
predictive
of the:p!Eidlbdlattu and discretionary characteristics of the decision,
even the factfinding aspects of the revocation hearing may have
little or no importance. All of these circumstances cast the role
and need for counsel in a significantly different light from that of
'·

:'

the lawyer in a criminal trial or appeal in which the central issue

,,

4.
is whether guilt or innocence has been determined in accordance

,,, ,.
with law. The probation officer is neither a policeman nor a
prosecuting attorney. As noted above, his duty to the probationer his client - is on a parity with his duty to society. The parole board,
likewise, has the primary responsibility for implementing the
.,

.~

restorative and rehabilitative purposes of the probation/parole

..

.

"

system. If, as the Court of Appeals held and respondent urges,
counsel were required in all probation and a parole revocation cases,
the result obviously would be burdensome upon the state for all of

,;:

,,,•.

the obvious reasons. More importantly the result could well be

'

·'··

self-defeating even of those who believe - with well-founded

l'~
,. '
"'-·
•:

,.

··!·

'''

justification - in the merit of liberalized concepts of probation and
parole. If these heretofore informal and flexible procedures should
be converted into mini-criminal trials, the battle lines inevitably

will be drawn; the proceedings will illlx tend to become adversary
in character; if counsel is provided for the probationer or parolee,

.."~ , .
...

:,

"'·,i,· ..~~

f

)'...
'~ ,

the state in turn must provide its own counsel; lawyers, by training
.,

;?\:~

\';
••,

-~
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• ·r •.~
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5.
and disposition are inclined to be combative, zealous and bound

, ... ,.

.

by the high duty of our profession to present all available evidence
in support of their clients and to contest vigorously all adverse
evidence; and in the hostilities generated by the heat of adversary
proceedings, parole boards n are like bodies - untrained as
judicial officers - may well be forced in many cases by the record
made public at the hearing to be less inclined to exercise a tolerant
discretion in favor of continued non-incarcerated rehabilitation.
We think the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the state
is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for oral indigent

probationers in all revocation cases. Such a rule would have the
merit of simplicity and ease of application, assuming (perhaps
without justification) that counsel in the requisite numbers will
be available and that a state can finance the cost.

But we find no

foundation in the Constitution or in reason to extend the "full

,~
'

panoply" of due process rights to a probationer or a parolee faced
with possible revocation, and Morrissey expressly so held. Supra
{

/

I

, I

i!

\
\

I
'

.

.•'

~

6.
at 480. In addition to the considerations discussed above, it is
.

common knowledge that the issues both of fact and as to the range

~··:'

'.

',

of decisions vary widely and unpredictably in such hearings. In
what may well be the typical case, the probationer or parolee
.~.

•;,,

has been convicted of committing another crime, or some other

,..

• • i-

violation of the conditions of his liberty has been irrefutably
,!

.

1,4!'

established by public record or athetw otherwise, or the

~

~-·
~ .

,

/
5
indtvtdual himself may have admitted the charges against him.

.

,,

I
While in some cases in these categories a probationer or parolee

I

I

I I

/ may have a satisfactory justification for the violation or a meritorious

I/

f

\

\

reasm why revocation ts not the most appropriate disposition,
amelio:ratory information of It this kincbdJf is often not susceptible

\

of probf or may be so personal or so simple as not to require
/

/

eithe:r investigation or exposition by CO\msel.

i: D

\

It is well to

I

\
".''

I

k47ep :In mind that we deal here not with the right of an accused
I

tr!

counsel in a criminal prosecution, but with the limited due

..... .

•
,;

~-",:"
r")i

·.,,

'

.

'

7.

.

~-··

rights of one who is a probationer or parolee only because already
6

he has been convicted of a crime.

We thus find no justification,

."

in law or in reason, for a new inflexible rule with respect to the

requirement of counsel. We think, rather, that the decision as to
the need for counsel must be decided on a case-by-case basis in
the exercise of a sound discretion by the appropriate state authority
'

'\

charged with responsibility for administering the probation and
parole system. Although the presence and participatioo of counsel
in the great majority of revocation hearings will probably be both

...

undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary, there will remain
certain cases in which fundamental fairness - the touchstone of
due process - will require that the state provide at its expense
counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.
It is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to ::hwiw.
formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed
in determining when the providing of counsel is necessary to

meet the minimal due process requirements. The facts and

"

,..

8.

circumstances are susceptible to almost infinite variation, and
a considerable discretion must be allowed the responsible agency
in making this decision.

Presumptively, it may be said that counsel

should be provided in cases where the probationer or parolee
i makes a timely and colorable claim (J) that he has not in fact

committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he

..
is at liberty; (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of record
or is uncontested, that there are substantial and documentable
reasons which justified the violation and make revocation inappropriate;
DII or (iii) that the issues in the particular case are so factually

0

.,'....

complex or otherwise intrinsicly difficult to develop and present
to the decision-making body that the assistance of counsel is necessary.

,,"'

In considering a request for the appointment of counsel, the
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responsible agency may consider - especially in doubtful cases whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively
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for himself.
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A. Sarah T<. Hunt, !Jte Revocation Decision: A Study of

Probation and Parole Agent 's Discretion, unpublished thesis,
University of Wisconsin 1964, cited in brief for petitioner at 106.
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B. Se~ Hunt, supra, quoted in petitioner's brief at 106.
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C. Remmington, Newman, Kimball, Melli & Goldstein,
Criminal Justice Administration, Materials and Cases, The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1969, at 910-911.

n is interesting
...•,

'

to nott:r that this case is an example of the liberal policies

praiced In Wisconsin. Appellant, despite having been convicted
of the serious felony of armed robbery and having been sentenced
to a 15 year prison term, was immediately placed cm probation
and allowed to leave Wisconsin and return to Illinois. Thereafter,
following the revocation which is the subject of this litigation,
and after a brief period of

JIii[

imprisonment, appellant was again

,.

.....

.."

released upon society (by parole) despite his confession - belated
disputed - of another serious felony offense in violation of his
probation agreement.

..

'

.
·,

"'
•,.~

'

2.
D. It is probable that a good deal of information which
may be quite relevant to the exercise of discretion either by the

·,
~:,,

probation officer or by the administrative agency which makes the

' .,

.

final decision comes from confidential sources which, for appropriate

',

'

reasons, w should not be disclosed on the public record or to the
probationer. There is a parallel here to the confidentiality of

" ...

~

·.-,.,

. ~r

information in presenting reports, customarily made available to

',,'

sentencing judges on a confidential basis. As stated in Williams
v. New Yorkz 337 U.

s.

241, 249 {1949):
·'
l,4;:,.

"The type and extent of this information make totally
impractical if not impossiele
open court
testimony with cross examination. "

.
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E. We are, of course, not unaware of the difficulty of
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3.
which the presence of counsel will materially assist the decisionmaking agency in ascertaining the relevant facts, and in pointing
the way to •fijJISdua a just result. In between these obvious types
of cases (which, with reason, we may hope will encompass the
vast majority of all cases), there will certainly arise a certain
number of cases in every state and from time to time in which
the decision whether to designate counsel is required under the

·...~

principle of fundamental faimess. Where a timely and colorable

/

claim has been made upon one or more of the grounds set forth
above, we think that both prudence and justice suggest the
'·,.'

'

deslrab1ility of resolving the doubt in favor of the probationer or
parolel'e. After all, his liberty is at stake.
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A.

Sarah K. Hunt, The Revocation Decision: A Study of

Probation and Parole Agent's Discretion, unpublished thesis,
University of Wisconsin 1964, cited in brief for petitioner at 106.
B.

See Hunt, supra, quoted in petitioner's brief at 106.

C.

Remmington, Newman, Kimball, Melli & Goldstein,

Criminal Justice Administration, Materials and Cases, The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1969, at 910-911.

It is interesting

to note that this case is an example of the liberal policies
practiced in Wisconsin.

Appellant, despite having been convicted

of the serious felony of armed robbery and having been sentenced
to a 15 year prison term, was immediately placed on probation
and allowed to leave Wisconsin and return to Illinois.

Thereafter,

following the revocation which is the subject of this litigation,
and after a brief period of mx: imprisonment, appellant .... again
released upon society (by parole) despite his confession - belated
disputed - of another serious felony offense in violation of his

-

2.
D.

It is probable that a good deal of information which

may be quite relevant to the exercise of discretion either by the
probation officer or by the administrative agency which makes the
final decision comes from confidential sources which, for appropriate
reasons, -w: should not be disclosed on the public record or to the
probationer.

There is a parallel here to the confidentiality of

information in presenting reports, customarily made available to
sentencing judges on a confidential basis. As stated in Williams
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249 (1949):
"The type and extent of this information make totally
impractical if not impossiele
open court
testimony with cross examination. it

"'>--

E. We are, of course, not unaware of the difficulty of
deciding on a case-by-case basis whether counsel should be
provided.

There will be the self evident cases at both ends of the

spectrut

with counsel rarely being required in the more or less

J

typical confessed or readily provable violationJ{ At the other
~ .....s.,.p~

end of the spectrum will be the <iHfiettlt and 09mplex case in
.,\

I\

3.

which the presence of counsel will materially assist the decisionmaking agency in ascertaining the relevant facts, and in pointing
the way to a just result. fu between these obvious cases (which, with
reason, we may hope will encompass the vast majority of all cases),
there will be a certain number of cases in which the decision will
be close and fairly arguable whether fundamental fairness requires
that counsel be provided. A sound discretion must be exercised in
such cases which should be set aside only when clearly abused. But
where a timely and colorable claim has been made upon one or more
of the grounds set forth above, we think that both prudence and justice
suggest the desirability of resolving the doubt in favor of the probationer or parolee. After all, his liberty is at stake.

•.

.-

Rider

( Gagnon) 3/9/73

Note to Bill Kelly:
A point made in petitioner brief which we have not answered
relates to the problem of "interstate cases" Brief 20, et seq.
I personally see no really good answer to this problem, which
may well be a serious one in view of the large numbers involved
and the specificity of the Morrissey requirements. I would like for
us to try, at least, to see if we can write a footnote which might
add a helpful gloss on the dilemma which apparently is created by
Morrissey.

The following represents an off the cuff first try:

Petitioner argues, with some reason, that the Morrissey
hearing requirements impose serious practical,_,i.f net tegi&J 9 (2,.,
problems where the parolee or probationer has been allowed to
leave the convicting state and be supervised elsewhere as was
~ re in this case.

Under t h e ~ interstate compact

authorized by the Congress, effective in Wisconsin (Wisconsin
£ atutes 1967,

§

57. 13) and in all other states, reciprocal

...,
~

2.

.'
provisions can be made for the out-of-state supervision of
probationers and parolees who are authorized to leave the sentencing
state.

Petitioner's brief asserts that as of June 30, 1972, Wisconsin

had a total of 642 parolees and probationers being so supervised in
other states, and that as of January 1972 incomplete information
released by the Council of State Governments indicated a total of
24, 693 persons under out-of-state supervision pursuant to the
interstate compact.

Petitioner's Brief, 21, 22.

''

The problems

arise with respect to Morrissey required hearings, and will vary

'
depending on the degree of cooperation from the officials of the
supervising state, where and when the hearings are to be held,
and whether witnesses are willing - when they cannot be compelled to attend a hearing in another state, and the like.
It is no· doubt true that added burdens and uncertainties

result from the Morrissey formulations.

Yet, we struck the

balance in favor of the specified due process requirements and
in the belief that accommodations can be made without undue

3.
disruption. If necessary, changes can be made to adjust the
interstate compact to the Morrissey-prescribed procedure. In
the absence of formal agreement, law enforcement and probation
and parole authorities among the states have~ long accommodated
themselves to the inevitable inconveniences of our federal system,
and have displayed a commendable willingness to cooperate.
'

.

The Morrissey requirement which causes petitioner the
greatest concern in this respect relates to the rights to present
witnesses, and to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses.
With respect to confrontation and cross examination, petitioner
may have overlooked the express qualification to the effect that
"the hearing officer [may] specifically [find] good

RXHXHB

for not allowing confrontation." Morrissey at 489.

cause

,.

There can

be a variety of satisfactory causes for not allowing the calling

r.

...

~

or the confrontation and cross examination of witnesses in the
type of administrative, informal hearing required in these cases.

.. ·..

)

4.
If it proves impractical or impossible to produce an out-of-state

witness, this may constitute the requisite good cause. As noted
elsewhere in iitm: Morrissey, evidence need not be in the customary
;

adversary form but letters, affidavits, depositions and other
,',

relevant material may be x:,msx substituted for more formal methods
~I

of triat.

,·

,"

.;

12.

The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding

lm

all but inevitably alter the proceeding in the direction of

greater formality.

Combative by training and disposition, the

lawyer will properly feel it his duty to contest all evidence and
to marshal all possible arguments in his client ~s favor.

The

Stat~ in turn, will surely feel it necessary to be represented
by its own counsel.

The adversary character of the hearing may

well make the hearing body more passive, less attuned to the
rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or parolee, and
more self-conscious in its public role.

\

And the financial costs -

for appointed counsel, counsel for the state, and longer record,
10

among other things, will be substantial.
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R.ider A, p. 12 ( Gagnon)&: 3/24/73

The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will
all but inevitably alter significantly the nature of such proceeding.
If counsel is provided for the probationer or parolee, the state in

turn will normally provide its own counsel; lawyers, by training
and disposition are inclined to be combative, zealous and bound by
the high sense of duty of our profession to present all available
evidence and arguments in support of their clients and to contest
with vigor or adverse evidence and views. The resulting adversary
character of the hearing, certainly in the typical :max

or,t,uutiua

routine case, is not likely to be in the interest of anyone. The
role of the hearing body itself, aptly described in Morrissey as
often being "predictative and discretionary" as well as fact finding,
may become more akin to that of a judge at a trial, less attuned to
the rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or parolee,
• and in the greater self consciousness of its public role, the hearing
body may be less tolerant of deviant xmhrc behavior and more compelled

2.
to reinca cerate rath r than continue:ncaean:loc nonpunitive
r h btlitation. Also the decision making process will be prolonged,
and th financial cost to the state - for appointed counsel, a: counsel
for the state, a Ion

r r cord and the possibility of judicial review,

10
will not be insubstantial.

Rider A, p. 8 ( Gagnon) 3/24/73

Th state also must ever bear in mind ''the safety of the general
community" Morrisse~ 408 U. S. at 477.

Rider, A, p.

( Gagnon) 3/9/73

In view of the tens of thousands of persons or, Jattomkio
probation and parole, an unbending rule requiring counsel in all
revocation cases could well impose a requirement which simply
could n,ot be met. The added increment of cost .. in terms of

I

I'

compfonsating counsel for indigent probationers and parolees,
I

I

I

the1'providing of counsel for the state, the employment of increased
I

personnel necessary for the expanded hearings and record keeping cert inly would not be insubstantial The more serious problem,
however, would relate to the availability of enough lawyers to
accommodate the substantial increase in demand. This problem,
already acute in view of demands resulting from Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. s. 335 (1965) and its progeny, caused concern

I

among members of the Court (though in m varying degrees)

I

in ~r esiEger v. Hamlin, supra, at 37, note 7; concurring opinion
I

of Mr. Justice Brennan, at 40, 41; concurring opinion of Chief
JustJ,ce Burger, at 44; and concurring opinion of Mr. Justice

I
P<J!well at 56-61.
I

i

.,

Rider A, p.

(Cagnon) 3/9/73

Add as a footnote at an appro rlate p~ce:
The Court's order placing Jlmlllllct respondent on probation
provided, among other things that "in the event of his failure to
meet the conditions of his probation he will stand committed under
th sentence alr ady imposed. " App. 1O. The

greement

pecifying the conditions of the probation, duly executed by
respondent, obligated him to "make a sincere attempt to avoid
all cts which are forbidden by law. " App. 12.

which the presence of counsel will materially assist the decisionmaking agency in ascertaining the relevant facts, and in pointing
the way to a just result. In between these obvious cases (which, with

..

,.

reason, we may hope will encompass the vast majority of all cases),
there will be a certain number of cases in which the decision will
be close and fairly arguable whether fundamental fairness requires
that counsel be provided. A sound discretion must be exercised in
such cases which should be set aside only when clearly abused. But
where a timely and colorable claim has been made upon one or more
of the grounds set forth above, we think that both prudence and justice
suggest the desirability of resolving the doubt in favor of the probationer or parolee. After all, his liberty is at stake.
1,;1..'

..'.,.'
I

I

which the presence of counsel will materially assist the decisionmaking agency in ascertaining the relevant facts, and in pointing
the way to

~

a just result. In between these obvious

i,t)OS

cases (which, with reason, we may hope will encompass the

number of cases in 9Ve.l'y--,fi#:ate a.Dd fpom time to time in which
the decision whether to designate counsel is re

ired under the

a,~~~~~~
principle of fund:ament

~/.W~4'-i

s. ?ere a timely and colorable

claim has been made upon one or more of the grounds set forth
above, we think that both prudence and justice suggest the
desirability of resolving the doubt in favor of the probationer or
parolee. After all, his liberty is at stake.

~

10.

IV.

We return to the facts of the present case. Because respondent
was not afforded either a preliminary hearing or a final hearing, the
revocation of his probation did not meet the standards of due process
prescribed in Morrissey. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to a
writ of habeas corpus. On remand, the District Court should allow
the State an opportunity to conduct such a hearing. As to whether the
State must provide counsel, respondent's admission to having committed
another serious crime creates the very sort of situation in which counsel
need not ordinarily be provided. But because of respondent's subsequent assertions regarding that admission, we conclude that the failure
of the State Board to provide respondent with the assistance of counsel
should be reexamined in light bf the views expressed in this opinion.
The general guidelines outlined above should be applied in the first
instance by those charged with conducting the revocation hearing .1

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

10.

/.J-,
IV.

We return/to-~ to the facts of the present case. Because
respondent was not afforded either a preliminary hearing or a
i:o:latcd dtte pt ocum,

hearing, the re o~ati~

final
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and respondent was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

I\

On remand,

the istrict ourt should allow the State an opportunity to conduct
such a hearing. As to whether the State must a.aaffaaa
,A

ii:xt!kP hearing, respondent's admission to having committed

another serious crime creates the very sort of situation in which
counsel need not ordinarily be provided. But because of respondent's
subsequent assertions regarding that admission, we conclude that/\
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guideline~ should be applied in the first instance by those

Mfirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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4.

is whether guilt or innocence has been determined in accordance
with law.
The probation officer is neither a policeman nor a prosecuting attorney. As noted above, his duty to the probationer-- his client is on a parity with his duty to society. The parole RBUR and probation
board, likewise, has the primary responsibility for implementing the
restorative and rehabilitative purposes of the probation/parole system.
If, as the Court of Appeals held and respondent urges, counsel were

required in all probation and parole revocation cases, the result would
be burdensome upon the public for all of the obvious reasons. There
would be substantial additional cost - of providing free counsel, additional
la:,r personnel and more records. Also, the inevitable delay, increased
formality, and uncertainty would change the character of revocation inquiriles. More importantly, the result could well be self-defeating even
to those who believe most ardently - with well-founded justification in the merit of liberalized concepts of probation and parole. If these
heretofore informal and flexible procedures should be converted into
mini-criminal trials, the battle lines inevitably will be drawn; if counsel
is provided for the probationer or parolee, the state in turn must provide

.

5.

its own counsel; the proceedings will tend to become formalized and
adversary in character; lawyers, by training and disposition are in•
clined to be combative, zealous and bound by the high duty of our profession to present all available evidence and arguments in support of
their clients and to contest vigorously all adverse evidence and views;
and in the hostilities generated by the heat of adversary proceedings,

·

...,

parole and probation board may well be forced in many cases by the
.,,

record made public at the hearing to be less tolerant of deviant behavior and feel

.

.,

'

~/

MICJeee

compelled to re-incarcerate rather than continue

non-punative rehabilitation.

.,.

We think the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the state
is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for !:!! indigent probationers in all revocation cases. Such a rule would have the merit

'.

,,:· ,I

.r..,.
l

of simplicity and ease of application, assuming (perhaps without justi-

..
•'

•

fication) that counsel in the requisite numbers would be available and that
a state could finance the cost. But we find no foundation in the Constitution

,,

or in reason to extend the "full panoply" of due process right$ to a pro,·

J

bationer or a parolee faced with possible revocation, and Mo~·rissey
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\
expressly so held. Supra It 480.
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.,·

,,,::

.

,."

In addition to the considerations discussed above, it is
,

,...... ,

common knowledge that the issues both of fact and as to the appropriate
.

;-··:
" .-··

disposition vary atdely and unpredicatably in such hearings. In what may

/:

well be the typical case, the probationer or parolee will have been convicted of committing another crime, or some other violation of the
conditions of his liberty will have been irrefutably established by
•

l

.,-.'I.

public record or otherwise, or the individual himself will have admitted
the charges against him. 5 While in some cases in these categories a
probationer or parolee may have a satisfactory justification for the

~.~

.:.,
'

.

,,

....

violation or a meritorious reason why revocation is not the most appro., r

priate disposition, amelioratory information of this kind is often not
susceptible of proof or may be so personal or so simple as not to require either investigation or exposition by counsel.

..
.,.'

It is well to keep, in mind that we deal here not with the

•.

,, ..
right of an accused to count.e l in a criminal prosecution, but with the
,••,'\

limited due process
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whether guilt or innocence has been determined in accordance

with
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The probation officer is neither a policeman nor a
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prosecuting attorney.

As noted above, his duty to the probationer ~ J,t,,.it..,.:~ ~~

his client - is on a parity with his duty to society.

The parol~ board,

likewise, has the primary responsibility for implementing the
restorative and rehabilitative purposes of the probation/parole
system. If, as the Court of Appeals held and respondent urges,
counsel were required ~

~

-

probation and x parole revocation cases,
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the result CMWiem.,~y would be burdensome upon the ~ ~ for all of
~ ~ ...... .,,_,t.,.,J.,,.,1-4 ; t --WliClll~.-4.i~
the obvious reasons.

More importantly the result could well be

self-defeating even 'f;{'those who believe~ - with well-founded
justification - in the merit of liberalized concepts of probation and
parole. If these heretofore informal and flexible procedures should
be converted into mini-criminal trials, the battle lines inevitably

.
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will be drawn; the proceedings will ex tend to become adversary
in character; if counsel is provided for the probationer or parolee,
the state in turn must provide its own counsel; lawyers, by training

~.
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and disposition are inclined to be combative, zealous and bound
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by the high duty of our profession to present all available evidence
in support of their clients and to contest vigorously all adverse
~
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evidence; and in the hostilities generated by the heat of adversary
~

judicial officers - may well be forced in many cases by the record
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ctie,e:pe,tion in favor of continued non-incarcerated rehabilitation.
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We think the Court of Appeals erred in holding that th state
is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for 8!'81 indigent
probationers in all revocation cases.

Such a rule would have the

merit of simplicity and ease of application, assuming (perhaps

~
without justification) that coun~

e r ? quisite num'oorsµ.

be available and that a state
foundation in the Constitution or in reason to extend the "full
panoply" of due process rights to a probationer or a parolee faced
with possible revocation, and Morrissey expressly so held.
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at 480. In addition to the considerations discussed above, it is
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common knowledge that the issues both of fact and as to theAMMP
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ecisions vary widely and unpredictably in such hearings.

In

what may well be the typical case, the probationer or parolee
~
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-Rtil been convicted of committing another crime, or some other
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violation of the conditions of his libertyiles been irrefutably
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established by public record or
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otherwise, or the

~

individual himself

~
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have admitted the charges against him.

While in some cases in these categories a probationer or parolee
may have a satisfactory justification for the violation or a meritorious
reason why revocation is not the most appropriate disposition,
amelioratory information of k this kindxhf is often not susceptible
of proof or may be so personal or so simple as not to require
D

either investigation or exposition by counsel.

<fl It is well to

keep in mind that we deal here not with the right of an accused
~

to counsel in a criminal prosecution, but with the limited du)\.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-1225
John R. Gagnon, Warden, On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of
Petitioner,
V.
Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
Gerald H. Scarpelli.
[April - , 1973]

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opm10n of the
Court.
This case presents the related questions whether a
previously sentenced probationer is entitled to a hearing
when his probation is revoked and, if so, whether he is
entitled to be represented by appointed counsel at such
a hearing.
I
Respondent, Gerald Scarpelli, pleaded guilty in July
1
1965, to a charge of armed robbery in Wisconsin. The
trial judge sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment, but
suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for
seven years in the custody of the Wisconsin Department
of Public Welfare ("the Department"). 1 At that time,
he signed an agreement specifying the terms of his probation and a "Travel Permit and Agreement to Return"
allowing him to reside in Illinois, with supervision there
1
The Court's order placing respondent on probation provided,
among other things, that "in the en'nt of his failure to meet the con-dit,ions of his probation he will stand committed under the sentence
already imposed. App., p. 10. The agreement specifying the conditions of the probation, duly executed by respondent, obligated him
to "make a sincere attempt lo avoid all acts which are forbidden by
law." App., p. 12.

"

71-1225-0PINION
C:AGNON v. SCARPELLI

under an interstate compact. On August 5, 1965, he
was accepted for supervision by the Adult Probation Department of Cook County, Illinois.
On August 6, respondent was apprehended by Illinois
police, who had surprised him and one Fred Kleckner,
Jr., in the course of the burglary of a house. After being
apprised of his constitutional rights, respondent admitted
that he and Fleckner had broken into the house for the
purpose of stealing merchandise or money, although he
now asserts that his statement was made under duress
and is false. Probation was revoked by the Department
on September 1, without a hearing.
The stated grounds
for revocation were that:
"1. [Scarpelli] has associated with known criminals,
in direct violation of his probation regulations and
his supervising agent's instructions;
"2. [Scarpelli] while associating with a known
criminal, namely, Fred Kleckner, Jr., was involved
in, and arrested for, a burglary on the evening of
August 5, 1965 in Deerfield, Illinois." App., p. 20.
On September 5, 1965, he was incarcerated in the Wisconsin State Reformatory at Green Bay to begin serving
the 15 years to which he had been sentenced by the trial
judge. At no time was he afforded a hearing.
Some three years later, on December 16, 1968, respondent applied for a writ of habeas corpus. After the petition had been filed, but before it had been acted upon,
the Department placed respondent on parole. 2 The District Court found that his status as parolee was sufficient
custody to confer jurisdiction on the court and that the
2 Respondent was initially paroled to a federal detainer to serve a
previously imposed federal sentence arising from another conviction.
He was sub ·eqncntly releas<'d from federal eu,tody, but remains a
parolee under the supervision of the Department.
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petition was not moot because the revocation carried
"collateral consequences," presumably including the restraints imposed by his parole. On the merits, the District Court held that revocation without a hearing and
counsel was a denial of due process. 317 F. Supp. 72
(ED Wis. 1970). The Court of Appeals affirmed, sub
nom. Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F. 2d 416 (CA7 1970), and
we granted certiorari. 408 U. S. 021 ( 1972).

II
Two prior decisions set the bounds of our present inquiry. In Mernpa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967), the
Court held that a probationer is entitled to be represented by appointed counsel at a combined revocation
and sentencing hearing. Reasoning that counsel is required "at every stage of a criminal proceeding where
substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected,"
389 U. S. 134, and that sentencing is one such stage, the
Court concluded that counsel must be provided an indigent at sentencing even when it is accomplished as part
of a subsequent, probation revocation proceeding. But
this line of reasoning does not require a hearing or counsel
at the time of probation revocation in a case such as the
present one, where the probationer was sentenced at the
time of trial.
Of greater relevance is our decision last Term in Mor-rissey v. Bre,wer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). There we held
that the revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal
prosecution.
"Parole arises after the end of the criminal prose-cution, including imposition of sentence. . . . Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute
liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only
of the conditional liberty properly dependent on
observance of special parole restrictions." 408 U. S.,.
at 480.

'·
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Even though the revocation of parole is not a part
of the criminal prosecution, we held that the loss of
liberty entailed is a serious deprivation requiring that
the parolee be accorded due process. Specifically, we
held that a parolee is entitled to two hearings, one a
preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and detention to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a violation of his parole and
the other a somewhat more comprehensive hearing prior
to the making of the final revocation decision.
Petitioner does not contend that there is any difference relevant to the guarantee of due process between
the revocation of parole and the revocation of probation,
nor do we perceive one.~ Probation revocation, like
parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution,
but does result in a loss of liberty. 4 Accordingly, we hold
that a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra.~
3 Despite the undoubted minor differences between probation and
parole, the commentators have agreed that revocation of probation
where sentence has been imposed previously is constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole. See, e. g., Van Dyke,
Parole Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel,
59 Calif. L. Rev. 1215, 1241-1243 (1971); Sklar, Law and Practice in
Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. Crim. L. C. P. S.
175, 198 n. 182 (1964).
4
It is clear at least after Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, that a
probationer can no longer be denied due process, in reliance on the
dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935), that probation
is an "act of grace."
5 Petitioner argues in addition that the Morrissey hearing requirements impose serious practical problems in cases such as the present
one in which a probationer or parollee is allowed to leave the convicting State for supervision in another State. Such arrangements
are made pursuant to an interstate compact adopted by all of the
States, including Wisconsin. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 57.13. Petitioner's
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III
The second, and more difficult, question posed by this
case is whether an indigent probationer or parolee has a
due process right to be represented by appointed counsel
at these hearings. 6 In answering that question, we draw
heavily on the opinion in Morrissey. Our first point of
reference is the character of probation or parole. As
noted in Morrissey regarding parole, the "purpose is to
help individuals reintegrate into society as soon as they
brief asserts that as of June 30, 1972, Wi~consin had a total of 642
parolees and probationers under supervision in other States and that
incomplete statistics as of January 1972 indicated a national total
of 24,693 persons under out-of-state supervision. Petitioner's Brief,
pp. 21-22.
Some amount of disruption inevitably attends any new constitutional ruling, and we are confident that modification of the interstate compact can remove without undue strain any technical hurdles
to compliance with Morrissey. However, an additional comment is
warranted with respect to the rights to present witnesses and to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Petitioner's greatest
concern is with the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from
perhaps thousands of miles away. While in some cases there is
simply no adequate alternative to live testimony, we emphasize that
we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where appropriate
of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits,
depositions, and documentary evidence. Nor did we intend to foreclose the States from holding both the preliminary and the final hearings at the place of violation or from developing other creative solutions to the practical difficulties of the Morrissey requirements.
0 In Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, we left open the question "whether
the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to
appointed counsel if he is indigent." 408 U. S., at 489. Since
respondent did not attempt to retain counsel but asked only for
appointed counsel, we have no occasion to decide in this case whether
a probationer or parolee has a right to be represented at a revocation hearing by retained counsel in situations other than those where
the State would be obliged to furnish counsel for an indigent.

,,. ,
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are able .... " 408 U. S., at 477. The duty and attitude
of the probation or parole officer reflect this purpose:
"While the parole or probation officer recognizes
his double duty to the welfare of his clients and to
the safety of the general community, by and large
concern for the client dominates his professional attitude. The parole agent ordinarily defines his role
as represeuting his client's best interests as long as
these do not constitute a threat to public safety." 7
Because the probation or parole officer's function is not
so much to compel conformance to a strict code of behavior as to supervise a course of rehabilitation, he has
been entrusted traditionally with broad discretion to
judge the progress of rehabilitation in individual cases,
and has been armed with the power to recommend or
even to declare revocation.
In Morrissey, we recognized that the revocation decision has two analytically distinct components:
"The first step in a revocation decision involves a
wholly retrospective factual question: whether the
parolee has in fact acted in violation of one or more
conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined
that the parolee did violate the conditions does the
second question arise: should the parolee be recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to
protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation?" Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at
479-480. 8
RC'mington, l\"ewman, Kimball, MC'lli & Gokbtein, Criminal ,Justice Admini,tration, l\InterialH and Ca~es 910-911 (1969).
8
The factor-· entering into these dcci.;ion~ rdate in major part to
a professional evaluation, by traiued probation nnd parole officers,
as to the OYC1'all social readju8tment of the offender in the community, and include consideration of such variables as the offender's
relationship toward his family, his attitude toward thC' f'ulfillmC'nt
7
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The parole officer's attitude toward these decisions reflects
the rehabilitative rather than punitive focus of the probation/parole system:
"Revocation ... is, if anything, commonly treated
as a failure of supervision. While presumably it
\\"ould be inappropriate for a field agent never to
revoke, the whole thrust of the probation-parole
movement is to keep men in the c01mnunity, working with adjustment problems there, and using revocation only as a last resort when treatment has
failed or is about to fail." 0
But an exclusive focus on the benevolent attitudes of
those who administer the probation/parole system when
it is working successfully obscures the modification in
attitude which is likely to take place once the officer has
decided to recommend revocation. Even though the
officer is not by this recommendation converted into a
prosecutor committed to convict, his role as counsellor to
the probationer or parolee is surely undermined.
"\Vhen the officer's view of the probationer's or parolee's
conduct differs in this fundamental way from the latter's
own view, due process requires that the difference be
resolved before revocation becomes final. Both the pro'
of financial obligations, the extent of his coopera1ion with the probation officer assigned to his case, his per~onal associations, andof course-whether 1here have been specific and ,;ignifirant violations
of the conditions of the probation. The importance of these considerations, some factual and others entirely judgmeutal, is illrn,t.rated
by a \Viscon,,in empirical study which disclosed that some "twentyfiye percent of the offenders studied [on probation or parole] who
committed new offenses were [nevertheless-I continued on firld
supervision . . . . " S. Hunt, The Revocation Derision: A Study
of Probation and Parole Agrnt's Discretion (unpublishrd thrsis on
file at the library of the University of Wisconsin) (196-±), cited in
Petitioner's Brief, Addrndum, p. 106.
0
Remington, Newman, Kimball, l\felli & Goldstein, supra, n. 7, at
910-911.

,,
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bationer or parolee and the State have interests in the
accurate finding of fact and the informed use of discretion, the probationer or parolee to insure that his liberty
is not unjustifiably taken away and the State to make
certain that it is not unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation. The State also must ever
bear in mind "the safety of the general community."
Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at 477.
It was to serve all of these interests that Morrissey
mandated preliminary and final revocation hearings. At
the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is entitled to notice of the alleged violations of probation or
parole, an opportunity to appear and to present evidence
in his own behalf, a conditional right to confront adverse witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, and a
written report of the hearing. Morrissey v. Brewer;
supra, 408 U. S., at 487. The final hearing is a less summary one because the decision under consideration is the
ultimate decision to revoke rather than a mere determination of probable cause, but the "minimum requirements
of due process" include very similar elements:
" (a) written notice of the claimed violations of
[probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the ·[probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; ( c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses ( unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause
for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and
detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole
board, members of which need not be judicial officers
or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the fact~
finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking [probation or] parole." M orrissery v.
Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at 489.

'·
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These requirements in themselves serve as substantial
protection against ill-considered revocation, and petitioner argues that counsel need never be supplied. What
this argument overlooks is that the effectiveness of the
rights guaranteed by Morrissey may in some circumstances depend on the use of skills which the probationer
or parolee is unlikely to possess. Despite the informal
nature of the proceedings and the absence of technical
rules of procedure or evidence, the unskilled or uneducated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in
presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the
presentation requires the examining or cross-examining
of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex documentary evidence.
By the same token, we think that the Court of Appeals erred in accepting respondent's contention that the
State is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel
for indigents in all probation or parole revocation cases.
While such a rule has the appeal of simplicity, it would
impose direct costs and serious collateral disadvantages
without regard to the need or the likelihood in a particular case for a constructive contribution by counsel..
In most cases, the probationer or parolee has been convicted of committing another crime or has admitted the
charges against him. 10 And while in some cases he
may have a justifiable excuse for the violation or a convincing reason why revocation is not the appropriate
disposition, mitigating evidence of this kind is often not
susceptible of proof or is so simple as not to require either
investigation or exposition by counsel.
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will all but inevitably alter significantly the nature of
the proceeding. If counsel is provided for the proba10

See Sklar, supra, n. 3, at 192 (parole), 193 (probation).
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tioner or parolee, the State in turn will normally provide
its own counsel; lawyers, by training and disposition , are
inclined to be combative, zealous and bound by the high
sense of duty of our profession to present all available
evidence and argume11ts in support of their clients' positions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence
and views. The role of the hearing body itself, aptly
described in Morrissey as being "predictive and discretionary" as well as factfinding, may become more akin
to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned to the
rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or
parolee. In the greater self-consciousness of its quasijudicial role, the hearing body may be less tolerant of
marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to
reincarcerate rather than continue nonpunitive rehabilitation. Certainly, the decisionmaking process will be
prolonged, and the financial cost to the State-for appointed counsel, counsel for the State, a longer record,
and the possibility of judicial review-will not be
insubstantial. 11
In some cases, these modifications in the nature of the
revocation hearing must be endured and the costs borne
because, as we have indicated above, the probationer's or
The scope of the practical problem which wo11lct be orcasionrd
by a requirem ent of roun~ol in all revocation cnses is suggest ed by
the fo ct that in the mid-19GO's there were a n es1imated tl\-cragr of
20,000 adult felon~· parole reYorations nnd 108,000 adult probation
rc\"OcutionR each year. President's Commission on Law Enforremrnt :md Administration of Justirc, T ask Forro Report: The Courts
56 n. 28 (1907) . The problem of the arnilability of lnw~rers, alrendy
nrut e in d ew of demands resulting from Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S . 335 (1965), nncl i1 s progcn~r, r:m s0d ronrern among members of the Court (though in rnrying degree~) in Argersing er v. Ilamlin. 407 U.S. 25 , 37 n. 7 (1972) (opinion of the Court); conrmring
opinion of MH. ,Ju S'l'ICE BRE N NA N , i d. , at 40, 41; C'OIH'UTTing opinion
of l\1'R. CHTEF .Tuwr1cE Bmwim., id., nt 4-1 ; and ron rurring opinion
of l\'IR. Jus'l'ICE Po1l'ELL, id., at 5G- Gl.
11
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parolee's version of a disputed issue can fairly be represeJlted only by a trained advocate. But due process is
not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in
informality, flexibility, and economy must always be
sacrificed.
In so concluding, we are of course aware that the caseby-case approach to the right to counsel in felony prosecutions adopted in Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942),
was later rejected in favor of a per se rule in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). See also Argersinger
v. Handin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972). We do not, however,
draw from Gideon and Argersinger the conclusion that a
case-by-case approach to furnishing counsel is necessarily
inadequate to protect constitutional rights asserted in
varying types of proceedings: there are critical differences
between criminal trials and probation or parole revocation hearings, and the probationer and parolee as well
as society have an interest in preserving these differences.
In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor; formal rules of evide11ce are in force; a defendant
enjoys a number of procedural rights which may be lost
if not timely raised; and, in a jury trial, a defendant
must make a presentation understandable to untrained
jurors. In short, a criminal trial under our system is
an adversary proceeding with its own unique characteristics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the
State is represented not by a prosecutor but by a parole
officer with the orientation described above; formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and
the members of the hearing body are familiar with the
problems and practice of probation or parole. The need
for counsel at revocation hearings derives not from the·
invariable attributes of those hearings but rather from
the peculiarities of particular cases.
The differences between a criminal (tal and a revocation hearing do not dispose altogether of the argument
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that under a case-by-case approach there may be cases
in which a lawyer would be useful but in which none
would be appointed because an arguable defense would
be uncovered only by a lawyer. Without denying that
there is some force in this argument, we think it a sufficient answer that we deal here not with the right of an
accused to counsel in a criminal prosecution, but with
the more limited due process right of one who is a probationer or parolee only because he has been convicted
of a crime. 12
We thus find no justification for a new inflexible constitutional rule with respect to the requirement of counsel. We think, rather, that the decision as to the need
for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the
exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority
charged with responsibility for administering the probation and parole system. Although the presence and participation of counsel in the great majority of revocation
hearings will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary, there will remain certain cases in
,:vhich fundamental fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require that the State provide at its expense
counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.
It is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed
in determining when the providing of counsel is necessary to meet the applicable due process requirements.
The facts and circumstances of these cases are susceptible
to almost infinite variation, and a considerable discretion
12
Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967) , establishing a juvenile's
right to appointed counsel in a delinquency proceeding whieh while
denominated civil was functionally akin to a criminal trial. A
juvenile charged with violation of a generally applicable tatute is
differently situated from an alrcad~·-convictcd probationer or parolee,
and i8 entitled to a higher degree of protection. See In re Winship,
397 U. S. 35 (1970) (the standard of proof in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding must be "proof beyond a reasonable doubt").
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must be allowed the responsible agency in making the
decision. Presumptively, it may be said that counsel
should be provided in cases where the probationer or
parolee makes a timely and colorable claim (i) that he
has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is a.t liberty; or (ii) that, even if
the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or
mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate. In passing on a request for the appointment of
counsel, the responsible agency also should consider,
especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself.
In every case in which a request for counsel is refused,
the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in
the record.

',

IV
We return to the facts of the present case. Because
respondent was not afforded either a preliminary hearing or a final hearing, the revocation of his probation did
not meet the standards of due process prescribed in
Morrissey. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to a
writ of habeas corpus. On remand, the District Court
should allow the State an opportunity to conduct such
a hearing. As to whether the State must provide counsel, respondent's admission to having committed another
serious crime creates the very sort of situation in which
counsel need not ordinarily be provided. But because of
respondent's subsequent assertions regarding that admission, we conclude that the failure of the Department
to provide respondent with the assistance of counsel
should be re-examined in light of this opinion. The
general guidelines outlined above should be applied in
the first instance by those charged with conducting the
revocation hearing.
Affirrned 1:n part, reversed in, part, and remanded ..
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents the related questions whether a
previously sentenced probationer is entitled to a hearing
when his probation is revoked and, if so, whether he is
entitled to be represented by appointed counsel at such
a hearing.

I
Respondent, Gerald Scarpelli, pleaded guilty in July,
1965, to a charge of armed robbery in Wisconsin. The
trial judge sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment, but
suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for
seven years in the custody of the Wisconsin Department
of Public Welfare ("the Department"). 1 At that time,
he signed an agreement specifying the terms of his probation and a "Travel Permit and Agreement to Return"
allowing him to reside in Illinois, with supervision there
'The Court's order placing respondent on probation provided,
among other things, that "[i]n the e,·ent of his failure to meet the conditions of his probation he will stand committed under the sentence
all ready [sic] imposed." App., p. 10. The agreement specifying
the conditions of the probation, duly executed by respondent, obligaicd him to "mnke a sincere ~1ttempt to avoid all acts which are
forbidden by law .... " App., p. 12.
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under an interstate compact. On August 5, 1965, he
was accepted for supervision by the Adult Probation Department of Cook County, Illinois.
On August 6, respondent was apprehended by Illinois
police, who had surprised him and 011e Fred Kleckner,
Jr., in the course of the burglary of a house. After being
apprised of his constitutional rights, respondent admitted
that he and Fleckner had broken into the house for the
purpose of stealing merchandise or money, although he
now asserts that his statement was made under duress
and is false. Probation was revoked by the Wisconsin
Department on September 1, without a hearing. The
stntecl grounds for revocation were that:

"1. [Scarpellil has associated with known criminals,
in direct violation of his probation regulations and
his supervising agent's instructions;
"2. [Scarpelli] while associating with a known
criminal, namely Fred Kleckner, Jr., was involved
in, and arrested for, a burglary . . . in Deerfield,
Illinois." App., p. 20.
On September 4, Hl65, he was incarcerated in the Wisconsin State Reformatory at Green Bay to begin serving
the 15 years to "·hich he had been sentenced by the trial
judge. At no time "·as he afforded a hearing.
Some three years later, on December 16, Hl68, respondent applied for a writ of habeas corpus. After the petition had been filed. but before it had been acted upon,
the Department placed respondent on parole." The District Court found that his status as parolee was sufficient
custody to confer jurisdiction on the court and that the
"He::,pondenl was initially paroled to a federal dctninN to ~eryc a
prc,·iously imposPd federal sentenrc n ri~ing from ano1 hrr rom·irt ion.
He was ,-ub8eq11entl_,· relra~rd from frdcrnl ru~tody, but rrmains a
pnrolrc under the supcn·ision of the Department.

~-
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petition ,,·as not moot because the revocation carried
"collateral consequences," presumably including the restraints imposed by his parole. On the merits, the District, Court hrld that revocation without a hearing and
counsel was a denial of due process. 317 F. Supp. 72
(ED Wis. 1970). The Court of Appeals affirmed, sub
nom. Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F. 2d 416 (CA7 1971), and
we granted certiorari. 408 U. S. 021 (1972).

II
Two prior decisions set the bounds of our present inquiry. In Mempa v. Rhay, 380 U. S. 128 (1967), theCourt held that a probationer is entitled to be represented by appointed counsel at a combined revocation
and sentencing hearing. Reasoning that counsel is required "at every stage of a criminal proceeding where
substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected,"
389 U.S., at 134, and that sentencing is one such stage, the
Court concluded that counsel must be provided an incligent at sentencing even "·hen it is accomplished as part
of a subsequent, probation revocation proceeding. But
this line of reasoning docs not require a hearing or counsel
at the time of probation revocation in a case such as the
present one, where the probationer ,vas sentenced at the
time of trial.
Of greater relevance is our decision last Term in Morrissey v. Bre,wer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). There we held
that the revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal
prosecution.
"Parole arises after the encl of the criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence. . . . Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute·
liberty to ,Yhich every citizen is entitled, but only
of the conditional liberty properly dependent on
observance of special parole restrictions." 408 U. S.,
at 480.
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Even though the revocation of parole is not a part
of the criminal prosecution, we held that the loss of
liberty entailed is a serious deprivation requiring that
the parolee be accorded clue process. Specifically, we
held that a parolee is entitled to two hearings, one a
preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and detention to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a violation of his parole and
the other a somewhat more comprehensive hearing prior
to the making of the final revocation decision.
Petitioner does not contend that there is any difference relevant to the guarantee of due process between
the revocation of parole and the revocation of probation,
nor do we perceive one. 3 Probation revocation, like
parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution,
but does result in a loss of liberty. 4 Accordingly, we hold
that a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra."
3 Despite the undoubted minor differences between probation and
parole, the commentators have agreed that revocation of probation
where sentence has been imposed previously is constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole. See, e. g., Van Dyke,
Parole Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel,
59 Calif. L. Rev. 1215, 1241-1243 (1971); Sklar, Law and Practice in
Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. Crim. L. C. &
P. S. 175, 198 n. 182 (1964).
4
It is clear at least after Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, that a
probationer can no longer be denied due process, in reliance on the
dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490,492 (1935), that probation
is an "act of grace."
5 Petitioner argues in addition that the Morrissey hcariuf; requirements impose serious practical problems in cases such as the present
onr in which a probationer or parollcc is allowed to leave the conYicting State for supcn·ision in another State. Such arrangements
arc made pursuant to an interstate compact adopted by all of the
States, including Wiscon~in. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 57.13. Petitioner's
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III
The second, and more difficult, question posed by this
case is whether an indigent probationer or parolee has a
due process right to be represented by appointed counsel
at these hearings. 0 In answering that question, we draw
heavily on the opinion in Morrissey. Our first point of
refere11ce is the character of probation or parole. As
noted in Morrissey regarding parole, the "purpose is to
help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive
individuals as soon as they are able .... " 408 U. S., at
brief asserts that as of June 30, 1972, Wisconsin had a total of 642
parolees and probationers under supervision in other States and that
incomplete statistics as of June 30, 1971, indicated a national total
of 24,693 persons under out-of-state supervision. Petitioner',; Brief,
pp. 21-22.
Some amount of disruption inevitably attends any new constitutional ruling, and we are confident that modification of the inter-state compact can remove without undue strain any technical hurdles
to compliance with Morrissey. However, an additional commmt is
warr:rnted with respect to the rights to present witnesses and to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Petitioner's greatest
concern is with the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from
perhaps thousands of miles away. While in some cases there is
simply no adequate alternative to live testimony, we emphasize that
we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where appropriate
of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits,
depositions, and documentary evidence. Nor did we intend to foreclose the States from holding both the preliminary and the final hearings at the place of violation or from developing other creative solutions to the practical difficulties of the Morrissey requirements.
0 In Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, we left open the question "whether
the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to
appointed counsel if he is indigent." 408 U. S., at 489. Since
respondent did not attempt to retain counsel but asked only for
appointed counsel, we have no occasion to decide in thi::; case whether
a probationer or parolee has a right to be represented at a rerncation hearing by retained counsel in situations other than those where
the State would be obliged to furnish counsel for an indigent.
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477. The duty a11cl attitude of the probation or parole
officer reflect this purpose:
"While the parole or probation officer recognizes
his double duty to the welfare of his clients and to
the safety of the general community, by and large
concern for the client dominates his professional attitude. The parole agent ordinarily defines his role
as representing his client's best interests as long as
these do not constitute a threat to public safety." 1
Because the probation or parole officer's function is not
so much to compel conformance to a strict code of behavior as to supervise a course of rehabilitation, he has
been entrusted traditionally with broad discretion to
judge the progress of rehabilitation in individual cases,
and has been armed with the power to recommend or
even to declare revocation.
In JJ1 orrissey, we recognized that the revocation decision has two analytically distinct components:
"The first step in a revocation decision involves a
wholly retrospective factual question: whether the
parolee has in fact acted in violation of one or more
conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined
that the parolee did violate the conditions does the
second question arise: should the parolee be recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to
protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation?" J.l1 orrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at
479-480. 8
7 Remington, Newman, Kimball, l\Ielli & Gold,lein, Crimin.ii .Justice Administration, l\Talerial~ and Ca,e~ 910-Dll (1969).
8 The fartor~ entering into these dcci~ion~ rrlate i11 mnjor part to
a profc~~ional eYnl11ntion , h)· trninrcl probation or parole officers,
as to the overall sorial readj11,1ment of the offr11der in the rommunit~·, nnd include consideration of such n1riables as the offrndcr's
rcbtion:;hip toward his family, hi~ attitude toward the fulfillment
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The parole officer's attitude toward these decisions reflects
the rehabilitative rather than punitive focus of the probation/ parole systern:
"Revocation ... is, if anything, commonly treated
as a failure of supervision. While presumably it
,rnuld be inappropriate for a field agent never to
revoke, the whole thrust of the probation-parole
movement is to keep men in the community, working ,Yith adjustment problems there, and using revocation only as a last resort "·hen treatment has
failed or is about to fail." u
But an exclusive focus on the benevolent attitudes of
those who administer the probation/ parole system when
it is ,rnrking successfully obscures the modification in
attitude which is likely to take place once the officer has
decided to recommend revocation. Even though the
officer is not by this recommendation converted into a
prosecutor committed to convict, his role as counsellor to
the probationer or paro]re is surely undermined.
·w hen the officer's view of the probationer's or parolee's
conduct differs in this fundamental way from the latter's
o,Yn vie"·, due proce~s requires that the difference be
resolved before revocation becomes final. Both the proof financial obligations, 1he rxlrnt of hi~ coopcrat ion wi1 h the probation ofliecr a~::;igncd to his ra"r, his pcr,011111 assoC'iat ions, :mdof romsr-whrthcr there have brrn spreifir :rnd ~ignificant violations
of thr conditions of the probation. Thr importance of t hr,c considrrations, f'Oll1C factual nnd other;; rntirrl)' judgmental, is illustrated
by a \Vi,,;rornin cmpiricnl ::;tudy which cli:,;rlosrcl that some ·1twrntyfi1·r prrcr nt of the offrndrrs stuclird [on prob:ttion or parolr] who
eommittrcl nrw offcnsr;:; wrrc [ncYcrthclrss ·1 rontinurd on firlcl
st1pr1Tision . . . . " S. Hunt, The RcYoc-alion Dcci:;ion: .\ Stmly
of Probation and Parolr Agrnt'~ Di~rrct ion (unpubli~hrcl tlw~is on
filr at thr librnr)' of thr Uniwr~it.1· of "'\Yi~ron~in) (196+) , citrd in
Pct itionrr's Brirf, Aclclr11dnm, p. lOG.
0
Remington, Nc,Yman, Kimball, l\1elli & Goldstein, supra, n. 7, at

910-911.
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bationer or parolee and the State ha,·e interests in the
accurate finding of fact and the informed use of discretion, the probationer or parolee to insure that his liberty
is not unjustifiably taken away and the State to make
certain that it is neither unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the community.
It was to serve all of these interests that Morrissey
mandated preliminary and final revocation hearings. At
the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is entitled to notice of the alleged violations of probation or
parole, an opportunity to appear and to present evidence
in his own behalf, a conditional right to confront adverse witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, and a
written report of the hearing. Morrissey v. Brewer,
supra, 408 U. S., at 487. The final hearing is a less summary one because the decision under consideration is the
ultimate decision to revoke rather than a mere determination of probable cause, but the "minimum requirements
of clue process'' include very similar elements:
"(a) written notice of the claimed violations of
[probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [ probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; ( c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; ( cl) the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause
for not allowing confrontation); ( e) a 'neutral and
detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole
board, members of which need not be judicial officers
or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking [probation or] parole." M orrissery v.
Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at 489.
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These requirements in themselves serve as substantial
protection against ill-considered revocation, and petitioner argues that counsel need never be supplied. What
this argument overlooks is that the effectiveness of the
rights guaranteed by Morrissey may in some circumstances depend on the use of skills which the probationer
or parolee is unlikely to possess. Despite the informal
nature of the proceedings and the absence of technical
rules of procedure or evidence, the unskilled or uneducated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in
presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the
presentation requires the examining or cross-examining
of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex documentary evidence.
By the same token, we think that the Court of Appeals erred in accepting respondent's contention that the
State is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel
for indigents in all probation or parole revocation cases.
While such a rule has the appeal of simplicity, it would
impose direct costs and serious collateral disadvantages
without regard to the need or the likelihood in a particular case for a constructive contribution by counsel.
In most cases, the probationer or parolee has been convicted of committing another crime or has admitted the·
charges against him. 10 And while in some cases he
may have a justifiable excuse for the violation or a. convincing reason why revocation is not the appropriate·
disposition, mitigating evidence of this kind is of ten not
susceptible of proof or is so simple as not to require either
investigation or exposition by counsel.
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will alter significantly the nature of the proceeding.
If counsel is provided for the probationer or parolee, the·
10

See Sklar, supra, n. 3, at 192 (parole), 193 (probation) .
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State in turn " ·ill nonnally provide its own counsel;
lawyers, by training and disposition, are advocates and
bound by professional duty to present all available evidence and arguments in support of their clients' positions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence
and views. The role of the hearing body itself, aptly
described in Morrissey as being "predictive and discretionary" as well as factfincling, may become more akin
to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned to the
rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or
parolee. In the greater self-eonsciousness of its quasijudicial role, the hearing body may be less tolerant of
marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to
reincarcerate rather than continue nonpunitive rehabilitation. Certainly, the dccisionrnaking process will be
prolonged, and the financial cost to the State-for appointed counsel, counsel for the State, a longer record,
and the possibility of judicial review-will not be
insubstantial. 11
In some cases, these modifications in the nature of the
revocation hearing must be endured and the costs borne
because, as we have indicated above, the probationer's or
parolee's version of a disputed issue can fairly be represented only by a trained advocate. But due process is
not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in
informality, flexibility, and economy must alwa.ys be
sacrificed.
In so concluding, we arc of course a,rnre that the caseby-case ariproach to the right to counsel in felony prosecu11

Thr ;.:copr of the praetiral problrm whiC"h would br oec·:1~io1wd

br a requirrmrnt of c·oun,rl in :1 II rrrnr:1tio11 ca~es is "ugge,trd by
the fact that in the mid-19G0's therr ,1·c•rr an rstimn1rd a1·rrage of
20,000 adult frlon~· parnle rr, oration" and 108.000 adult prnhat ion
rcYora t ions each ~·rar. l'rrsidr11t 's Comm is~ion on Law Fn l'orrcmrnt. nncl Aclmini~trntion of .T11~fi<'<'. Ta,.:k Force Rc•port: The Comts
5G n . 28 (1967).

•
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tions adopted in Betts v. Bra.dy, 316 U. S. 455 (1942),
was later rejected in favor of a per se rule in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). See also Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972). We do not, however,
draw from Gideon and Argersi11ger the conclusion that a
case-by-case approach to furnishing counsel is necessarily
inadequate to protect constitutional rights asserted in
varying types of proceedings: there are critical differences
between criminal trials and probation or parole revocation hearings, and both society and the probationer or
parolee have stakes in preserving these differences.
In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor; formal rules of evidence are in force; a defendant
enjoys a number of procedural rights which may be lost
if not timely raised; and, in a jury trial, a defendant
must make a presentation understandable to untrained
jurors. In short, a criminal trial under our system is
an adversary proceeding with its ov,;n unique characteristics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the
State is represented not by a prosecutor but by a parole
officer with the orientation described above; formal procedures and rules of evidence arc not employed; and
the members of the hearing body are familiar with the
problems and practice of probation or parole. The need
for counsel at revocation hearings derives not from the
invariable attributes of those hearings but rather from
the peculiarities of particular cases.
The differences between a criminal trial and a revocation hearing do not dispose altogether of the argument
that under a case-by-case approach there may be cases
in which a lawyer would be useful but in ,vhich none
would be appointed because an arguable defense would
be uncovered only by a lawyer. Without denying that
there is some force in this argument. we think it a suffi-.
cient answer that we deal here not with the right of an
accused to counsel in a criminal prosecution, but with
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the more limited due process right of one who is a probationer or parolee only because he has been convicted
of a crime. 12
We thus find no justification for a new inflexible constitutional rule v.:ith respect to the requirement of counsel. We think, rather, that the decision as to the need
for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the
exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority
charged with responsibility for administering the probation and parole system. Although the presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable
and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain cases in which fundamental
fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require that
the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.
It is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed
in determining ·when the providing of counsel is necessary to meet the applicable due process requirements.
The facts and circumstances in preliminary and final
hearings are susceptible of almost infinite variation , and
a considerable discretion must be allowed the responsible
agency in making the decision. Presumptively, it may
be said that counsel should be provided in cases where,
after being informed of his right to request counsel, the
probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on
a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not comCf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) , establishing a juvenile's
right to appointed counsel in a delinquency proceeding which while
denominated civil was fun ctionally akin to a crimiml trial. A
juvenile charged with violation of a generally applicable statute is
differently situated from rm already-convicted probationer or pnrolrc,
and is entitled to n higher degree of protection. Sec In re Winship,
397 U. S. 358 (1970) (the standnrd of proof in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding must be "proof beyond a reasonable do11bt").
12
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mitted the alleged violation of the conditions upon which
he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a
matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate and that the
reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or
present. In passing on a request for the appointment of
counsel, the responsible agency also should consider,
especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself.
In every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record.

IV
We return to the facts of the present case. Because
respondent was not afforded either a preliminary hearing or a final hearing, the revocation of his probation did
not meet the standards of due process prescribed in
Morrissey, which we have here held applicable to probation revocations. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to
a writ of habeas corpus. On remand, the District Court
should allow the State an opportunity to conduct such
a hearing. As to whether the State must provide counsel, respondent's admission to having committed another
serious crime creates the very sort of situation in which
counsel need not ordinarily be provided. But because of
respondent's subsequent assertions regarding that admission, see p. 2, ante, we conclude that the failure of the
Department to provide respondent with the assistance
of counsel should be re-examined in light of this opinion.
The general guidelines outlined above should be applied
in the first instance by those charged with conducting the
revocation hearing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded ..
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Court.
This case presents the related questions whether a
previously sentenced probationer is entitled to a hearing
when his probation is revoked and, if so, whether he is
entitled to be represented by appointed counsel at such
a hearing.

I
Respondent, Gerald Scarpelli, pleaded guilty in July,
1965, to a charge of armed robberyin Wisconsin. The
trial judge sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment, but
suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for
seven years in the custody of the Wisconsin Department
of Public Welfare ("the Department"). 1 At that time,
he signed an agreement specifying the terms of his probation and a "Travel Permit and Agreement to Return"
allowing him to reside in Illinois, with supervision there
1 The Court's order placing respondent on probation provided,
among other things, that "[i]n the event of his failure to meet the conditions of his probation he will stand committed under the sentence
all ready [sic] imposed." App., p. 10. The agreement specifying
the conditions of the probation, duly executed by re8pondent, obligatrd him to "make a sincere attempt to avoid all acts which are
forbidden by law .... " Ap11., p. 12.

~-
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under an interstate compact. On August 5, 1965, he
,ms accepted for supervision by tho Adult Probation Department of Cook County, Illinois.
On August 6, respondent was apprehended by Illinois
police, who had surprised him and one Fred Kleckner,
Jr., in the course of the burglary of a house. After being
apprised of his constitutional rights, respondent admitted
that he and Flcckner had broken into the house for the
purpose of stealing merchandise or money, although he
now asserts that his statement was made under duress
and is false. Probation was revoked by the Wisconsin
Department on September 1, without a hearing. The
stated grounds for revocation were that:
"1. [Scarpelli] has associated with known criminals,
in direct violation of his probation regulations and
his supervising agent's instructions;
"2. f Scarpelli] while associating with a known
crirn.inal, namely Fred Kleckner, Jr., was involved
in, and arrested for, a burglary . . . in Deerfield,
Illinois." App., p. 20.
On September 4, 1065, ho was incarcerated in the Wisconsin State Reformatory at Green Bay to begin serving
the 15 years to which he had been sentenced by the trial
judge. At no time was he afforded a hearing.
Somo three years later. on December 16, 1968, respondent applied for a writ of habeas corpus. After the petition had been filed, but before it had been acted upon,
tho D0partment placed respondent on parole." The District Court found that his status as parolee was sufficient
custody to confer jurisdiction on the court and that the
"Rr8pondrnt wa8 initial!,\· parolrd to a frdrral drtainN to ~C'J'\'C a
prcYiou~ly imposrcl ff•drr::tl ~rntpnrc ari~inµ; from anothrr eorn·irtion.
Ile w::is subscriuentl~· released from federal ru~tody , but remain, a
parolee under the supen·i~io11 of 1hr Drpartment.

.,
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petition was not moot because the revocation carried
"collateral consequences," presumably including the restraints imposed by his parole. On the merits, the District Court held that revocation without a hearing and
counsel ,ms a denial of due process. 317 F. Supp. 72
(ED Wis. 1970). The Court of Appeals affirmed, sub
nom. Gw1solus Y. Gagnon, 454 F. 2d 416 (CA7 1971), and
we granted certiorari. 408 U. S. 921 (1972).

II
Two prior drcisions set the bounds of our present inquiry. In Mcmpa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967) , the
Court held that a probationrr is entitled to be represented by appointed counsel at a combined revocation
and sentenci11g hearing. Reasoning that counsel is required "at every stage of a criminal proceeding where ,
substantial rights of a, criminal accused may be affected,"
389 U.S., at 134, and that sentencing is one such stage, the
Court concluded that counf"el must be provided an indigent at sentencing even when it is accomplished as part
of a subsequent, probation revocation proceeding. But
this line of reasoning docs not require a hearing or counsel
at the time of probation revocation in a case such as the
present one, where the probationer was sentenced at the
timr of trial.
Of greater relevance is our decision last Term i11 Morris.sey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). There we held
that the revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal
prosccutiou.
"Parole arises after the encl of the criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence. . . . Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute
liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only
of the conditional liberty properly dependent on
observance of special parole restrictions." 408 U. S.,
at 480.
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Even though the revocation of parole is not a part
of the criminal prosecution, we held that the loss of
liberty entailed is a serious deprivation requiring that
the parolee be accorded clue process. Specifically, we
held that a parolee is entitled to two hearings, one a
preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and detention to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a violation of his parole and
tho other a somewhat more comprehensive hearing prior
to the making of the final revocation decision.
Petitioner does not contend that there is any difference relevant to the guarantee of clue process between
tho revocation of parole and the revocation of probation,
nor do we perceive one.~ Probation revocation, like
parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution,
but does result in a loss of liberty.4 Accordingly, v.e hold
that a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra."
3 Despite the undoubted minor differences between probation and
pnrole, the commentntors have agreed that revocation of probation
where sentence hns been imposed previously is constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole. See, e. g., Van Dyke,
Parole Revocation Henrings in California: The Right to Counsel,
59 Calif. L. Rev. 1215, 1241-1243 (1971); Sklar, Law and Practice in
Probation and Parole Revocation Hearing~, 55 J. Crim. L. C. &
P. S. 175, 198 n. 182 (1964).
4
It is clear at least after Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, that a
probationer can no longer be denied due process, in rcliame on the
dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935), tha1 proba1ion
i8 an "act of grace."
5 Petitioner argues in addition that the Morrissey henriug requirements impose serious practical problems in cases surh as the present
onr in which a probationer or JXtro ee i8 allowed to leave the convicting State for supervision in another State. Snrh arrnngemcnts
:no made pursuant to an interstate compact ndopte<l by all of the
States, including vVi,;ron~in. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 57.13. Petitioner's
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III
The second, and more difficult, question posed by this
case is whether an indigent probationer or parolee has a
due process right to be represented by appointed counsel
at these hearings.G In answering that question, we draw
heavily on the opinion in Morrissey. Our first point of
reference is the character of probation or parole. As
noted in Morrissey regarding parole, the "purpose is to
help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive
individuals as soon as they are able .... " 408 U. S., at
brief asserts that as of June 30, 1972, Wisconsin had a total of 642
parolees and probationers under supervision in other States and that
incomplete statistics as of June 30, 1971, indicated a national total
of 24,693 persons under out-of-state supervision. Petitioner's Brief,
pp. 21-22.
Some amount of disruption inevitably attends auy new constitu~ - - - - - :tc""JO-:'.r:::-:rn:,l- r=t:,
11:-::in itt!d 1t}c arc confidentJtnat mod1ffcat1on of the interstate compact can remove without undue s~·ain . tee mica mr es
to compliance with Morrissey. ~ n additional comment is
warranted with respect to the rights to present witnesses and to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Petitioner's greatest
concern is with the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from
perhaps thousands of miles away. While in some cases there is·
simpl_v no adequate alternative to live testimony, we emphasize that
we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where appropriate·
of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits,
depositions, and documentary evidence. Nor did we intend to foreclose the States from holding both the preliminary and the final hearing~ at the place of violation or from developing other creative solutions to the practical difficulties of the Morrissey requirrments.
6 In :Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, we left open the question "whether
the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained couusrl or to
appointed counsel if he is indigent." 408 U. S., at 489. Since
respondent did not attempt to retain c01msel but nsked only for
appointed counsel, we ]rn,ye no occasion to decide in this case whether
a probationer or parolee has a right to be rcprcscn1rd at a reyocation hearing by retained counsel in si1 uations other than those where·
the State would be obliged to furnish counsel for an indigent.
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The duty and attitude of the probation or parole
officer reflect this purpose:
"\Vhile the parole or probation officer recognizes
his double duty to the ,yelfare ,of his clients and to
the safety of the general community, by and large
concern for the client dominates his professional attitude. The parole agent ordinarily defines his role
as representing his client's best interests as long as
these do not constitute a threat to public safety." 1

477.

Because the probation or parole officer's function is not
so much to compel conformance to a strict code of behavior as to supervise a course of rehabilitation, he has
been entrusted traditionally with broad discretion to
judge the progress of rehabilitation in individual cases,
and has been armed "·ith the power to recommend or
even to declare revocation.
In Morrissey, we recognized that the revocation decision has two analytically distinct components:
"The first step in a revocation decision involves a
wholly retrospective factual question: whether the
parolee has iu fact acted in violation of one or more
conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined
that the parolee did violate the conditions does the
second question arise: should the parolee be recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to
protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation?" Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at
479-480. 8
7
Remington, Nrwman, Kimball, i\frlli & Golcl~trin, Criminal .Justicr Aclmini~tration, l\Tateriab :illcl Ca,,rs 910-911 (1960).
8
Thr factor:; rnlrring into the,;o drri.,ioM rdato ill major part 1o
a profr~sional ornluation, b~· trninrcl proh:1 tion or parolr ofnrors,
ns to thr ovrrall i,;oeial rradj 11~tmr11t of the offrllclor ill thr community, and inrludo ronsiclerntion of sueh Ynrinblrs ns l ho offrndrr's
rrlationi-hip toward his family, his altitude toward tlw fnlfillmont
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The parole officer's attitude toward these decisions reflects
the rehabilitative rather than punitive focus of the probation/ parole system:
"Revocation ... is, if anything, commonly treated
as a failure of supervision. While presumably it
,rnuld be inappropriate for a field agent never to
revoke, the \\·hole thrust of the probation-parole
movement is to keep men in the community, working with adjustment problems there, and using revocation only as a last resort "·hen treatment has
failed or is about to fail." 9
But an exclusive focus on the benevolent attitudes of
those who administer the probation/ parole system when
it is working successfully obscures the modification in
attitude ,Yhich is likely to take place once the officer has
decided to recommend revocation. Even though the
officer is not by this recommendation converted into a
prosecutor committed to convict, his role as counsellor to
the probationer or parolee is w;~~W+GB'Fm~e&.,....-7:,-,
\Vhen the officer's view of the probationer's or parolee's
conduct differs in this fundamental way from the btter's
om1 view, due process requires that the difference be
resolved before revocation becomes final. Both the proof foiancial obligations, the extent of hi~ cooperation wil h the probation officer ns~igncd to his case, Iris per~ounl aRsoriation~, nmlof cotir.;e-whet her there h:we been ~pcrifir nncl ~ignifie:rnt Yiolnt ions
of the conditions of the probation. The impor1nnce of these considerations, some factual and others entirely judgnwntal, is illns1 rated
by a Wi.,.,ron.sin empirical study wliich di~closed that Rome "lwrnt>·fh·e 1wrcent of the offenders studied on probation or parole] who
committed new offenses were [nevcrt hele~s) con1 inued on field
~npervi,,;ion . . . . " S. Hunt, The Rernrat ion Deci~ion: A Study
of Probation find P,1role Agent's Di~cretion (unpuhli~hed thr~i~ on
file at the library of the Uni\·cr~it>· of \Yisron~in) (196+), ei1ccl in
Petitionrr's Brief, Addendum, p. 106.
9
Rrmington, Nc\rm.'\n, Kimball, Melli & Goldstein, supra, n. 7, at

r

910-911.
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bationor or parolee and tho State have interests in the
accurate finding of fact aJJd the informed use of discretion, the probationer or parolee to insure that his liberty
is not unjustifiably taken away and the State to make
certain that it is neither unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently prej udicing the safety of the community.
It was to serve all of these interests that Morrissey
mandated preliminary and final revocation hearings. At
the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is entitled to notice of the alleged violations of probation or
parole, an opportunity to appear and to present evidence
in his own behalf, a couditional right to confront adverse witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, and a
·written report of the hearing. NI orrissey v. Brewer,
supra, 408 U. S., at 487. The final hearing is a less summary one because the decision under consideration is the
ultimate decision to revoke rather than a mere determination of probable cause, but the "minimum requirements
of due process" include very similar elements:
"(a) written notice of the claimed violations of
[probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the {probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; ( c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; ( d) the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses ( unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause
for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and
detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole
board, members of which need not be judicial officers
or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking [probation or] parole." M orrissery v.
Brewer, supra, 408 U. S., at 489.
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These requirements in themselves serve as substantial
protection against ill-considered revocation, and petitioner argues that counsel need never be supplied. What
this argument overlooks is that the effectiveness of the
rights guaranteed by Morrissey may in some circumstances depend on the use of skills which the probationeror parolee is unlikely to possess. Despite the informal
nature of the proceedings and the absence of technical
rules of procedure or evidence, the unskilled or uneducated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in
presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the
presentation requires the examining or cross-examining
of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex documentary evidence.
By the same token, we think that the Court of Appeals erred in accepting respondent's contention that the
State is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel
for indigents in all probation or parole revocation cases.
While such a rule has the appeal of simplicity, it would
impose direct costs and serious collateral disadvantages
without regard to the need or the likelihood in a particular case for a constructive contribution by counsel.
In most cases, the probationer or parolee has been convicted of committing another crime or has admitted the
charges against him. 10 And while in some cases he
may have a justifiable excuse for the violation or a convincing reason why revocation is not the appropriate·
disposition, mitigating evidence of this kind is often not
susceptible of proof or is so simple as not to require either
investigation or exposition by counsel.
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will alter significantly the nature of the proceeding.
If counsel is provided for the probationer or parolee, the·
10

Sec Sklar, supra, n. 3, at 192 (parole), 193 (probation).
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State in turn \\'ill normally provide its own counsel;
lawyers, by training and disposition, are advocates and
bound by professional duty to present all available evidence and arguments in support of their clients' positions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence
and views. The role of the hearing body itself, aptly
described in Morrissey as being "predictive and discretionary" as well as factfinding, may become more akin
to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned to the
rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or
parolee. In the greater self-consciousness of its quasijudicial role, the hearing body may be less tolerant of
marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to
reincarcerate rather than continue nonpunitive rehabilitation. Certainly, the decisionmaking process will be
prolonged , and the financial cost to the State-for appointed counsel. counsel for the State, a longer record,
and the possibility of judicial review- will not be
insubstantial. 11
In some cases, these modifications in the nature of the
revocation hearing must be endured and the costs borne
because, as we have indicated above, the probationer's or
parolee's version of a disputed issue can fairly be represented only by a trained advocate. But due process is
not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in
informality, flexibility, and economy must always be
sacrificed.
In so concluding, ·we are of course a·ware that the caseby-case approach to the right to counsel in felony prosccu11

ThC' :-<ropC' of 1hr praetir:il prohlrm \\'hieh would br orr:i~ionrd

b~· a rr quirrmrnt of eoun~rl in all r r ,·oration r:i~e~ is ~uirii:r~tecl by
ihe fart that in thr mid-1960'~ thrrr " ·rrr an r~timntrd :11·rr:1gr of
20,000 ::iclult frlon.,· p:irolr rr\'Or:ition~ :ind 108,000 :idult prob:ttion
rp,·oc-a tion~ r:1rl1 ~·ra r. Prr~idr111 '~ Comrni~~ion on Law En forrcmrnt ::i nd Admini~lrnt ion of .Tu~t ier, T:1~k Foree Rrport: Thr Courts
56 11 . 28 (1967).

•.
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tions adopted in Belts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (Hl42),
"·as later rejected in favor of a ])er se rule in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 lT. S. 335 (1963). See also Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972). \Ve do not, however,
dra,Y from Gideon and 1lrgersi11uer the conclusion that a
case-by-case approach to furnishing co11 nsel is necessarily
inadequate to protect constitutional rights asserted in
varying types of proceedings: there are critical differences
between criminal trials and probation or parole revocation hearings, and both society and the probationer or
parolee have stakes in preserving these differences.
In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor; formal rules of evidence are in force; a defendant
enjoys a number of procedural rights which may be lost
if not timely raised; and, in a jury trial. a defendant
must make a presentation understandable to untrained
jurors. In short, a criminal trial under our system is
an adversary proceeding with its own unique characteristics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the
State is represellted not by a prosecutor but by a parole
officer with the orientation described above; formal proCC'dures and rules of evidence are not employed; and
the members of the hearing body arc familiar with the·
problems and practice of probation or parole. The need
for counsel at revocation hearings derives not from the
invariable attributes of those hearings but rather from
the peculiarities of particular cases.
The differences bet,Yeen a criminal trial and a revocation hearing do not dispose altogether of the argument
that under a case-by-case approach there may be cases
in which a lawyer would be useful but in which none
would be appointed because an arguable defense would
be uncovered only by a lawyer. Without denying that
there is some force in this argument, we think it a sufficient answer that we deal here not with the right of an
accused to counsel in a criminal prosecution, but with

,.
I
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the more limited due process right of one who is a probationer or parolee only because he has been co1wicted
of a crime. 1 "
We thus find no justification for a new inflexible constitutional rule ,Yith respect to the requirement of counsel. We think. rather, that the decision as to the need
for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the
exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority
charged with responsibility for administering the probation and parole system. Although the presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable
and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there will reinain certain cases in which fundamental
fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require that
the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.
It is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to fornrnlate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed
in determining when the providing of counsel is necessary to meet the applicable due process requirements.
The facts and circumstances in preliminary and final
hearings are susceptible of almost infinite variation, and
a considerable discretion must be allowed the responsible
agency in making the decision. Presumptively, it may
be said that counsel should be provided in cases where,
after being informed of his right to request counsel, the
probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on
a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not comCf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967), establishing a juvenile's
right to appointed counsrl i11 a delinquency proceeding which while
deuominated civil was functionally akin to a criminal trial. A
.iuv0nilc charged with violation of a generally applicable ;;ta111te is
different!~· situated from an already-convicted probationer or parolee,
and is entitled to a higl1C'r degree of protection. See In re Winship,
397 U. S. 358 (1970) (the standard of proof in a juvenile drlinquency
proceeding mu8t be "proof beyond a rea~ona ble doubt").
12

71-1225-0PINION
GAGNON v. SCARPELLI

13

mitted the alleged violation of the conditions upon which
he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a
matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate and that the
reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or
present. In passing on a request for the appointment of
counsel, the responsible agency also should consider,
especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself.
In every case in v,:hich a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record.

IV
We return to the facts of the present case. Because
respondent was not afforded either a preliminary hearing or a final hearing, the revocation of his probation did
not meet the standards of due process prescribed in
Morrissey, which we have here held applicable to probation revocations. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to
a writ of habeas corpus. On remand, the District Court
should allow the State an opportunity to conduct such
a hearing. As to whether the State must provide counsel, respondent's admission to having committed another
serious crime creates the very sort of situation in which
counsel need not ordinarily be provided. But because of
respondent's subsequent assertions regarding that admission, see p. 2, ante, we conclude that the failure of the
Department to provide respondent with the assistance
of counsel should be re-examined in light of this opinion.
The general guidelines outlined above should be applied
in the first instance by those charged with conducting the
revocation hearing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in parl, and remanded.

